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Leadership Capstone courses.  This study analyzes the needs 
of the Surface Warfare Officer Leadership Capstone Course
at USNA.  The purpose of this research is to use 
qualitative data to determine how the USNA SWO Leadership 
Capstone Course should be structured, and to determine the 
appropriate balance between leadership education and 
practical training.  The research also determines whether 
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the expectations of Commanding Officers, Executive 
Officers, Department Heads, and Division Officers in the 
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onboard their first ship. In addition to holding focus 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A. USNA ACADEMIC PROGRAM REVIEW 
At the United States Naval Academy, our focus is 
on producing combat leaders for our Navy and 
Marine Corps. In fact, the one thing that makes 
us unique among other colleges and universities 
is our mission, which has remained essentially 
unchanged since 1845 (Rempt, 2005b, p. 5)
For over 150 years, the faculty and staff of the 
United States Naval Academy (USNA) have satisfied their 
mission of developing “Midshipmen morally, mentally, and 
physically” (Rempt, 2006a, p.3).  However, since the Naval 
Academy was founded, the process by which this mission is 
accomplished has come under periodic review.  In 2005 the 
USNA Superintendent directed an institution-wide, internal 
academic program review. “The basic questions this review 
sought to address were (1) whether the Academy is educating 
its graduates to meet the requirements of the Naval 
Service, and (2) whether [the Academy is] doing so in the 
most effective and efficient way” (Rempt, 2005a, p. 1).  
During the review process, spokespersons from each 
academic division proposed changes they argued would 
increase the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the USNA 
academic program.  One proposed change is a reduction of 
the minimum number of credit hours required for graduation
to 138, which necessitates a reduction of the number of 
credit hours allocated for Officer Development (ODEV) and 
Professional Development (PRODEV) curricula.  Because of 
this proposed requirement, the ODEV and PRODEV Divisions 
have been tasked with reviewing their curricula, and 
investigating the impact of reducing the number of credit 
2hours allocated for their disciplines from twenty-one to a 
total of eighteen hours (Athens, Campbell, Thomas, Rubel, 
2005). The focus of this research is one of the changes
that must be incorporated into the ODEV and PRODEV 
curricula.
B. OFFICER DEVELOPMENT AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
DIVISIONS
The United States Naval Academy, with its civilian and 
military faculty and staff, is by design suited to execute 
its vision of “Providing leaders of great character, 
competence, vision and drive to transform the Navy and 
Marine Corps, and serve the nation in a century of promise 
and uncertainty” (Rempt, 2005c, p.4).  To fulfill its 
mission and achieve this vision, the Naval Academy has 
constructed a curriculum that consists of the following 
fundamental elements:
-core requirements in engineering, natural 
sciences, the humanities and social sciences, to 
assure that graduates are able to think, solve 
problems and express conclusions clearly; 
- an academic major that permits a midshipman to 
explore a discipline in some depth and prepare 
for graduate level work (USNA Admissions, 2005, 
p. 55).      
The Officer Development and Professional Development 
Divisions are responsible for the third fundamental element 
that is made up of “core academic courses and practical 
training to teach the professional and leadership skills 
required of Navy and Marine Corps officers” (USNA 
Admissions, 2005, p. 55).  Although both divisions are 
charged with preparing Midshipmen to receive a commission, 
each is distinctly and fundamentally different.
3Officer Development Division consists of the 
Leadership, Ethics, and Law (LEL), and Character 
Development Departments; and the Honor Program.  The goal 
of the Officer Development Division is to “integrate the 
moral, ethical, and character development of midshipmen 
across every aspect of the Naval Academy experience” (ODEV 
Homepage, 2006, p.1). These experiences include academic 
coursework in ethics, leadership, and behavioral science 
curricula, Brigade leadership, athletics, and summer 
training, among others. Using the classroom as a setting, 
this integrated program focuses more on leadership 
education and theory than practical training.
The Professional Development Division is comprised of 
the Professional Programs and the Seamanship and Navigation 
Departments (SEANAV).  The Department of Professional 
Programs oversees the summer training and career 
information programs at the Naval Academy, while SEANAV 
serves as the academic arm of the division.  SEANAV is 
responsible for developing the practical skills Midshipmen 
need to become successful Navy and Marine Corps Officers. 
Thus, unlike ODEV, the PRODEV Division may be seen as 
focusing more on training than education (PRODEV Homepage, 
2006, p.1).
These two divisions, who have different but equally 
significant goals, have been tasked with collaborating on 
the design of a revised NL40X curriculum that is intended 
to serve as the last ODEV/PRODEV course of a Midshipman’s 
four years at USNA.  Therefore, an analysis must be 
conducted to determine which changes to the current NL40X 
curricula are appropriate, so that the education and 
training potential of the course is maximized.  Should the 
4focus of the course be a culminating leadership, character, 
and moral education experience (a true capstone), should it 
be focused on practical, warfare community specific 
training (a practicum), or is it possible and practical to 
focus on both?
To make the issue more complicated, NL40X courses are 
organized according to warfare community, each of which has 
unique training and educational needs.  Traditionally, 
NL40X courses have been primarily tailored to provide First 
Class Midshipmen with the knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
attitudes (KSAA’s) needed for the next step of their 
career.  Unlike all other warfare communities, the Surface 
Warfare Officer Community, has no follow-on school; SWO 
Ensigns are trained by coupling the Division Officer at Sea 
Program (DOSP) computer based training (CBT) modules with 
hands on experience.  Thus, NL401, the focus of this 
research, is the last period of dedicated classroom 
instruction our future Surface Warriors will receive before 
reporting aboard their first ship as Division Officers 
(DIVO’s).
C. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
The purpose of this research is to improve the 
effectiveness and quality of USNA Ensigns reporting to 
their initial Division Officer tours aboard ships.  This 
study will use qualitative data to determine how the USNA 
Surface Warfare Officer Leadership Capstone Course (NL401) 
should be structured, so that the curriculum approaches an 
appropriate balance between the goals of the Officer 
Development and Professional Development Divisions; a 
balance between professional education and practical 
5training.  The research will also determine whether or not 
there is a gap between USNA graduate performance and the 
expectations of Commanding Officers (COs), Executive 
Officers (XOs), Department Heads (DHs), and Division 
Officers (DIVOs) in the Fleet, and whether or not NL401 can 
provide SWO Ensigns the knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
attitudes (KSAAs) they are expected to possess on the day 
they arrive onboard their first ships. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question for this study is:
 To maximize the educational and training opportunity 
of NL401, how should the course be structured, so 
that a balance is struck between character, ethical, 
and leadership education, and practical training?
The secondary research questions are:
 Is there a gap between the content of NL401 and the 
KSAAs Ensigns are expected to possess the day they 
arrive onboard their first ships?
 Can/Will the NL401 curriculum be improved by 
incorporating elements of the Division Officer at 
Sea Program (DOSP) Computed Based Training (CBT) 
modules into the curriculum? 
 Is the Naval Academy taking full advantage of the 
unique training opportunities available to them, 
such as simulators, Yard Patrol Craft, and Sailing 
Programs? 
 Is there or should there be a mechanism in place to 
receive feedback from the fleet on the effectiveness 
of the NL401 curriculum?
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The scope of this thesis includes (1) an assessment of 
the education and training needs of a Midshipman enrolled 
in the SWO Leadership Capstone Course (NL401) at the United 
States Naval Academy, (2) a determination of the proper 
6balance between the ethical, character, leadership, and 
warfare community specific development of a First Class 
Midshipman who selected Surface Warfare, (3) an 
identification and definitions of the essential knowledge, 
skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAAs) required of all 
Surface Warfare selected Ensigns reporting to their first 
sea-going commands, and (4) a prioritization of these KSAAs 
from the perspectives of various levels of SWO leadership. 
Because NL401 is the last classroom time available for 
training and educating future Surface Warfare Officers 
before they report to their first ships, it must be 
utilized effectively and the time allocated for it used 
efficiently.  
Interviews with varying levels of Surface Warfare 
leadership (O-1 to O-5, and various ship types) were 
conducted at Surface Warfare Officers School Command 
(SWOSCOLCOM), Newport, RI and at USNA.  The interviews were 
held in the spring of 2006.  Those interviewed had previous 
operational exposure to the Division Officer at Sea 
Program, and had expert knowledge of the subject.  During 
the interviews they were asked to comment on what they 
believed to be the core competencies of Ensigns in the 
Surface Force on the day they arrive onboard their first 
ships (training and educational goals of NL401), what they 
believed to be the most effective way USNA can achieve 
these competencies, what they believed the purpose of NL401 
should be, and various other related questions.
In addition to active-duty Surface Warfare Officers 
enrolled in curricula at Surface Warfare Officers School 
Command and stationed at USNA, two focus groups at USNA 
were held.  The intention of these focus groups was to gain 
7insight from two sets of critical NL401 stakeholders who 
would presumably explore the issues from different angles 
than the Fleet.  The first group was composed of sixteen 
NL401 instructors.  These instructors had different levels 
of experience and involvement with the course and 
ODEV/PRODEV curricula.  All instructors were active duty 
Surface Warfare Officers with a variety of fleet 
experience, and the vast majority had no background or 
training in teaching or designing college level material.  
The other focus group was composed of a panel of 
Distinguished Military Professors (retired military and 
reserve personnel), Permanent Military Professors (active 
duty USN), and the Chairman of the Leadership, Ethics and 
Law Department (active duty O-6).
F. LIMITATIONS
This study uses qualitative data to provide an 
expansive, exploratory view of the needs and 
responsibilities of, and the relationships between the 
Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community, USNA, ODEV/PRODEV 
Divisions and their curricula, and NL401.  These 
relationships will are examined in the context of current 
Fleet operations and policies, namely the 2002 elimination 
of the six-month Division Officer’s Course at SWOSCOLCOM in 
favor of the Division Officer at Sea Program (DOSP).  
Implementation of the DOSP shifted the responsibility for 
initial accession training from SWOSCOLCOM to the Fleet, 
and has raised concerns in the SWO community (Vaas, 2004).  
Because of the relatively short time the program has been 
in effect and the issues it has raised, biased interviews 
from Fleet personnel were expected. Active-duty respondents 
often wanted to concentrate discussion around the pros and 
8cons of DOSP, instead of focusing on the needs of the 
course.   However, when designing focus group and interview 
protocols, care was taken to minimize its effects.    
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is organized into six chapters.  The first 
chapter introduces the topic, and explains the potential 
benefits, purpose, scope, methodology, and limitations of 
the study.  Chapter II provides background information.  It 
includes a discussion of current USNA policies, and 
leadership education and professional development 
curricula, as well as the history and evolution of the 
Division Officer at Sea Program.  Chapter III reviews 
published literature pertaining to leadership and 
education, educational and training needs assessments, 
KSAAs, and capstone courses in higher education.  Chapter 
IV discusses the methodology of the study, outlines study 
participants, and  describes the interview and focus group 
formats used. Chapter V presents the data collected from 
the interviews and focus groups.  The data is presented 
according to the training and educational identified in the 
research. Also, the significance and prioritization of each 
need is discussed. Chapter VI summarizes the results, draws 
conclusions about current NL401 content and structure, and 
provides recommendations for improving the structure and 
content of the course.
9II. BACKGROUND
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
relationships among USNA strategy, policy, core leadership 
and professional education and training curricula, and 
current Surface Warfare Officer fleet training programs.    
These relationships provide context for understanding the 
impact and importance of restructuring NL401. This chapter 
provides a background of the Naval Academy’s Strategic 
Plan, the mission and vision of the United States Naval 
Academy, desired strategic outcomes, strategies to achieve 
the USNA vision, and the core academic courses and 
practical training specifically intended to prepare 
Midshipmen for service in the Navy and Marine Corps.  The 
sum of these character, leadership and professional 
education curricula and experiences is commonly referred to 
as the USNA Leadership Continuum. Next, background on the 
First Class Leadership Capstone Course and the Surface 
Warfare Officer Leadership Capstone Course (NL401) will be 
presented.  Lastly, the background and evolution of the 
Surface Navy’s Division Officer at Sea Program is 
discussed, as well as the impact its implementation has had 
on NL401. 
B. USNA STRATEGIC PLAN, MISSION, AND STATEMENT OF 
STRATEGIC VISION
1. USNA Strategic Plan
The Naval Academy’s Strategic Plan…is our shared 
road map to the future. It provides the foresight 
and focus to make decisions that will benefit the 
Brigade of Midshipmen and the Naval Academy for 
the next 10 years. The plan will help insure that 
10
we avoid mission drift and maintain the 
appropriate balance between academic, 
professional, and athletic programs. When kept in 
balance, these are complimentary programs at our 
premier leadership institution. (Rempt, 2005c, p. 
2)
In 1998, under the supervision of the Superintendent, 
the United States Naval Academy published its first 
Strategic Plan. The purpose of the plan was to solicit 
input from USNA stakeholders that would provide guidance 
and direction for the Naval Academy for the upcoming 
decade.  “Alumni, volunteers, faculty, administration, 
parents and friends, as well as the Board of Visitors” were 
asked how they believed the Naval Academy could be improved 
(Rempt, 2005c, p.2).  The inputs were compiled and 
considered, and published by Senior USNA leadership in 
2001, and “recast in 2005/2006” (Rempt, 2005c, p.2).
2. USNA Mission
During the 1998 strategic planning process, the Core 
Planning Team, which was chaired by the Commandant of 
Midshipmen, and included members such as President of the 
Faculty Senate, Director of Professional Development, Naval 
Academy Athletic Association Associate Director, and 
Brigade of Midshipmen representative, “reaffirmed the 
continuing validity of the existing USNA Mission Statement:
To develop midshipmen morally, mentally and 
physically and to imbue them with the highest 
ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to  
provide graduates who are dedicated to a career 
of naval service and have potential for future 
development in mind and character to assume the 
highest responsibilities of command, citizenship 
and government. (USNA Superintendent and Various, 
1999, p.6)
11
This mission encompasses the mandates of the institution 
and identifies the Naval Academy’s reason for existence 
(Bryson, 1995).  Following the validation of the mission 
statement, the Core Planning Team created a Naval Academy 
“statement of strategic vision.”
3. USNA Statement of Strategic Vision
When establishing a vision for an organization, those 
involved with the strategic planning process develop an 
idea of what the organization “should look like once it has 
successfully implemented its strategies and achieved its 
full potential” (Bryson, 1995, p.35).  In the case of the 
Naval Academy, stakeholders in the 1998 strategic planning 
process reached consensus on a three-part statement of 
strategic vision. This statement is comprised of a succinct 
vision, strategic outcomes, and strategies.  “The succinct 
Vision describes what the Academy aspires to accomplish: 
Provide leaders of great character, competence, vision, and 
drive to transform the Navy and Marine Corps, and serve the 
nation in a century of promise and uncertainty” (USNA 
Superintendent and Various, 1999, p.7). 
a. Strategic Outcomes
The second aspects of the statement of strategic 
vision are strategic outcomes.  These are results the Naval 
Academy wishes to attribute to itself as an institution and 
to its graduates.  USNA stakeholders envision the Naval 
Academy as the premier accession source for Navy and Marine 
Corps Officers; officers who are equipped with the 
knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAAs) to make 
lifelong contributions to the welfare of our nation.  In 
addition to these institutional attributes, the following 
12
list of graduate attributes was created as part of USNA’s 
espoused strategic outcomes: 
 Graduates who are prepared to lead in combat
 Courageous leaders who take responsibility for 
their personal and professional decisions and 
actions
 Role models of ethical behavior and moral conduct
 Exemplars of academic, technical and tactical 
competence
 Individuals with a passion and commitment to 
lifelong learning and physical fitness
 Highly effective communicators
 Leaders who recognize and value individual 
excellence regardless of cultural or ethnic 
background
 Graduates who are able to understand and 
integrate geopolitical complexities in their 
decision making across the spectrum of military
operations
 Patriots who epitomize the rich heritage, honor 
and traditions of the Navy, Marine Corps and our 
country (USNA Superintendent and Various, 1999, 
p.7)
b. Strategy to Achieve Vision 
The strategy to achieve the Naval Academy’s 
vision is composed of eight fundamental and complimentary 
elements.  Among them are academic and admissions 
excellence, effective communications, physical fitness 
excellence, naval heritage, and quality of life for USNA 
students.  However, the remaining two strategic elements, 
character building, and leadership and professional 
excellence, are the responsibility of the ODEV and PRODEV 
divisions.  These elements and the appropriate balance 
between them are the focus of this thesis.
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In summary, the 1998 USNA Strategic Plan Core 
Planning Team first affirmed the Academy’s mission.  
Grounded in the mission, they then created a three-part 
statement of strategic vision.  This statement is comprised 
of a succinct vision, strategic outcomes and finally, a 
strategy to achieve their vision.  In 2005 the strategic 
plan was recast, mandating that the elements of the 1998 
USNA Strategic Plan remain at the forefront of USNA goals, 
policies, programs, and curricula.  Concurrently, the USNA 
Superintendent directed an Academic Program Review in 2005 
to determine whether or not USNA was meeting the Academy’s 
mission and vision, and the needs of the Fleet, in the most 
effective and efficient way. As a result, changes have 
occurred and have been proposed within the ODEV/PRODEV 
organization and curricula. These proposed changes 
necessitate an analysis of the USNA Leadership Continuum 
and in turn NL401. 
C. USNA CHARACTER, LEADERSHIP, AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING CONTINUUM 
1. Character Building and Leadership and 
Professional Excellence
Character building, and leadership and professional 
excellence are central to achieving USNA’s vision of 
developing leaders who will guide the Navy and Marine Corps 
in the 21st Century.  The United States Naval Academy 
defines character building as:
 Doing the “right thing” & promoting selfless 
service    
 Ensuring moral development & character building 
permeate the Naval Academy experience
 Inculcating the core values of honor, courage and 
commitment
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 Promoting a lifetime commitment to the highest 
standards of moral and ethical behavior (USNA 
Superintendent and Various, 1999, p.8)
According to the Strategic Plan, leadership and 
professional excellence will be achieved by:
 Preparing midshipmen for the opportunities of 
command & the challenges & realities of combat 
leadership
 Imbuing midshipmen with a profound respect for 
the Constitution & the importance of the chain of 
command
 Promoting an understanding of & demonstrating a 
commitment to the highest standards of moral & 
ethical behavior
 Fostering an environment that promotes mutual 
trust, loyalty & personal accountability in 
everything we do 
 Provide midshipmen with the professional skills 
necessary to be successful Navy & Marine Corps 
officers (USNA Superintendent and Various, 1999, 
p.9)
The following paragraphs will describe the way in which the 
ODEV and PRODEV Divisions meet these strategic objectives; 
the USNA Leadership Continuum.
2. Developing Navy and Marine Corps Leaders of 
Character    
The goal of the USNA Leadership Continuum is to 
produce “leaders of character who are servants of the 
nation, standard bearers of the naval profession, and 
warriors” (Athens, et al., 2005a, p.2).  The process by 
which this goal is reached is a character, leadership, and 
professional education continuum that is “sequenced, 
integrated and coordinated across the Midshipman 
experience, that gains synergy through reinforcement and 
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habituation, and that strikes a deliberate and conscious 
balance between education and training” (Athens, et al., 
2005a, p.2).
a. Core Courses in Character and Leadership 
Education (ODEV)
In a presentation assembled in 2006, USNA 
Distinguished Military Professor of Character, CAPT Jim 
Campbell, USN (Ret), describes the USNA Midshipman 
leadership development experience.  The following table 
illustrates the core ODEV academic courses:
Mandatory Leadership, Ethics and Law/ODEV Academic Courses
Course 
Designator
Course Description Course 
Credits
NL112 Leadership and Human Behavior 2-0-2
NE203 Ethics and Moral Reasoning for the 
Naval Leader
3-0-3
NL302 Leadership Theory and Application 2-0-2
NL400 Law for the Junior Officer 2-0-2
NL40X 1st Class Leadership Capstone 2-2-3
* Course credits indicates weekly lecture hours - laboratory hours - credit hours
Source: After (Campbell, personal communication, March 19, 2006)
Table 1.  Core LEL/ODEV Academic Courses
Additionally, according to Campbell, Midshipmen are 
subjected to the following leadership development 
experiences, which are outside the Naval Leadership and 
Naval Science curricula:
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 Saturday Morning Training (SMT)
 First Class Capstone Seminars
 FP130, US Govt. and Constitutional Development




 Fourth Class Sea Trials   
 Honor Remediation/Mentor Training
 Visiting speakers 
 Summer Training
 Company Officer time
 Midshipman Action Group (MAG)
(Campbell, personal communication, March 19, 2006, p.2)
These elements are integrated and coordinated throughout
the leadership continuum.  
b. Core Courses in Professional Education 
The professional education aspects of the 
leadership continuum are largely focused on summer training 
and other experiences outside the classroom.  However, 
there are three mandatory academic courses associated with 
the PRODEV Division that are taught during Plebe, Third 
Class, and Second Class years.  They are outlined in the 
following table:




Course Description Course 
Credits
NS100 Fundamentals of Naval Science: 
“Introduction to the basic 
concepts of seamanship, ship 
3-2-4
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handling, and coastal piloting. 
Includes at-sea labs on 108' 
Yard Patrol Craft (YPs).”
NN204 Navigation and Piloting: “Builds 
on concepts learned in NS100 and 
Third Class Summer Cruise. 
Specifically covers celestial 
and electronic navigation; basic 
meteorology; tides and currents; 
and voyage planning.”
2-2-3
NL310 Strategy and Tactics: provides 
instruction on the basic 
elements of strategic thought in 
military operations by Sun Tzu, 
Jomini, Mahan, and Corbett. Case 
studies are examined as well as 
current U.S. National, Joint, 
and Maritime strategy/doctrine 
and their applications. The 
application of basic warfare 
tactics is accomplished via use 
of Fleet Command, a commercial 
tactical gaming program” 
1-2-2
* Course credits indicates weekly lecture hours - laboratory hours - credit hours
Source: After (USNA Academic Dean Website, 2006)
Table 2.  Core Professional Development Academic Courses
These courses are an integral part of the leadership 
continuum and are intended to equip Midshipmen with the 
professional Navy and military knowledge base expected of 
service academy graduates who will presumably become future 
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leaders of an organization that only promotes from within.  
However, because of U.S. Navy and Naval Academy traditions, 
because roughly twenty-five percent of Midshipmen service 
select surface warfare, and because of available resources, 
core professional training is disproportionately weighted 
towards acquiring maritime skills.  Seamanship, 
shiphandling, navigation and piloting, tides and currents, 
are all skills that will directly benefit a future Surface 
Warfare Officer, but will not necessarily be used by 
Midshipmen who are commissioned into other warfare 
communities. The following table is a generic illustration 
of the leadership continuum:
United States Naval Academy Leadership Continuum













































































Source: From (Athens, et al., 2006a, p.5)
Table 3.   USNA Leadership Continuum
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The focus of this thesis is NL401, the First 
Class Midshipman Leadership Capstone Course for Midshipmen 
who selected Surface Warfare as their warfare community.  
This course is taught in the spring semester of First Class 
Year, and is intended to serve as a culmination of previous 
leadership, character and warfare community-specific 
development experiences.  It is the last academic element 
of the USNA Leadership Continuum and Midshipman leadership 
experience.  
c. Mandatory Summer Training Programs
In addition to core academic curricula that focus 
on teaching and training maritime skills, USNA requires all 
Midshipmen to participate in several summer training 
programs that lend themselves to acquiring skills that will 
directly benefit future Surface Warfare Officers.  In 2006, 
LT Peter Weston, composed a brief that outlined summer 
training required for graduation:
 Class of 2007 
 Gray Hull Cruise
 Classes of 2008-2009
 Gray Hull Cruise
 YP cruise or qualification 
OR
 Sailing cruise or qualification (CSNTS)
 Small Unit Leadership Experience
(Weston, 2006, p. 3) 
Ideally, these requirements would be fulfilled during Third 
Class summer, by coupling gray hull cruise with sailing or 
YPs.  The following table describes these programs:
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“CSNTS sends the sail training craft, Navy 44s, 
crewed by 3/c Midshipmen and led by 1/c Midshipmen, 
USNA Faculty, Staff or volunteers, to ports up the 
east coast for thirteen, two-week long training 
blocks.  
CSNTS crews go though extensive sailing, seamanship 
and navigation training to prepare them for their 
assignments during the preceding Fall, Winter and 
Spring”




Typically conducted during 3/c Summer, with an 
ideal distribution of 75% of Midshipmen underway on 





Yard Patrol (YP) cruise allows Midshipmen to crew 
108’ YPs.  During the cruise YPs operate in coastal 
waters along the East Coast, as squadrons. 
Midshipmen will have the opportunity to develop the 
maritime skills taught in NS100.
Source: After (Weston, 2006, p. 6)
Table 4.  Mandatory Summer Training Programs
d. Professional Education Opportunities for 
Future Surface Warfare Officers
As previously stated, USNA Professional 
Development Division concentrates its focus on teaching and 
training Midshipmen in maritime skills.  This is evidenced 
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by the fact that The Department of Seamanship and 
Navigation (SEANAV) is the only academic training 
department at USNA.  Additionally, USNA continues to 
maintain resources and programs such as a fleet of Yard 
Patrol Craft, a robust sailing program, and ship driving 
simulators that all lend themselves to teaching and 
training Surface Warfare-centric skills.  In addition to 
these programs, activities such as YP squadron and Surface 
Navy Association provide voluntary opportunities for 
aspiring Surface Warfare Officers to build upon their 
maritime skills. Experiences in these curricula, education 
and training programs, and extra-curricular activities are 
intended to be integrated throughout the Leadership 
Continuum, culminating in the USNA Surface Warfare Officer 
Leadership Capstone course.
D. USNA LEADERSHIP CAPSTONE COURSE BACKGROUND AND CURRENT 
STATUS
1. Practicum, NS40X (1995-2004)
Prior to 1995 the First Class Leadership Capstone, or 
practicum as it was called prior to 2005, was not a 
graduation requirement.  Although similar courses were 
offered as early as the 1960s, they were offered to 
Midshipmen as elective courses.  The graduating class of 
1995 was the first to be required to take the course.  The 
course was initially implemented as a response to the need 
to give Midshipmen the tools required to be successful at 
their first professional school.  Responsibility for 
designing the curriculum and teaching the course fell to 
the Professional Development (PRODEV) Division (Gannon, 
2000). In his 2000 thesis, Richard Gannon stated that the 
primary objective of the course was:
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To provide Midshipmen with a professional 
background that will prepare them for the service 
community they are about to enter, whether that 
be SWOS, nuclear power school, flight training, 
or TBS (Gannon, 2000, p.144).
According to Gannon, the secondary objectives of the course 
were:
1. To provide Midshipmen with a broader
understanding of the Navy and Marine Corps, their 
components and how they work together.  This 
understanding will increase their ability to 
articulate what the Navy and Marine Corps are 
about and will also increase their understanding 
of the challenges and opportunities that will 
become apparent to them as newly commissioned 
officers.
2. To provide Midshipmen with a specific depth of 
understanding expected of a graduate of a service 
academy regarding joint operations, information 
technology, and military sociology (Gannon, 2000, 
p.155)
To accomplish these objectives, active duty Naval Academy 
faculty and staff pooled their professional knowledge to 
generate course material, and instructors taught primarily 
from their Fleet experience.  No institution-directed, 
collective changes were made to the NS40X curriculum until 
2005 (Gannon, 2000).
2. Capstone (2005-Present)
Resulting from the 2005 Academic Program Review, the 
academic organization of the Naval Academy was 
restructured.  Professional Development Division was split 
into PRODEV and ODEV.  As a result of the restructuring, it 
was determined that responsibility for the course would 
fall under Officer Development Division.  The course 
designation was changed from NS40X to NL40X.  The intent 
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was that it be transitioned from a primarily training 
course to one with a balance of leadership education and 
practical training.  It was to be developed into a true 
leadership capstone.  The stated purpose and vision of the 
course is: 
The purpose of the Naval Leadership CAPSTONE 
course (NL 401-406) is to serve as the 
culminating leadership experience for 1/C MIDN in 
the area of leadership, character, and warfare 
community-specific development.  NL 40X augments 
the classroom environment with intensive 
laboratories designed to provide knowledge, 
skills, and abilities that will serve MIDN as 
they transition to service as commissioned 
officers (Thomas, 2005, p. 1).
Members of the graduating class of 2005 were the first 
to take the course intended to be a leadership capstone.  
However, little analysis was conducted regarding the needs 
of the course or the steps required for transitioning from 
a practicum to a true leadership capstone. Active duty 
military personnel remained as instructors.  Warfare 
community representatives conducted ad hoc reviews of their 
curricula and course material, yet there was still no 
collective guidance for teaching the course.  The reality 
is that NL40X remains primarily a practical training 
course, taught from the perspectives of Junior Officers who
were recently in the Fleet.  In response to the proposed 
changes to the Leadership Continuum and their curricula, 
Officer Development Division’s Distinguished Military 
Professors (DMP) have conducted recent studies and explored 
curriculum options that are relevant to this research.  The 
results of the studies have been briefed to senior USNA 
administrators, but have not been incorporated into the 
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curricula. These projects are the Officer Development 
System DMP Integration Project and a ODEV/PRODEV review of 
core course options.
3. Officer Development System DMP Integration 
Project
From March to September 2005, ODEV Division DMPs 
conducted a project they referred to as the DMP integration 
project.  The purpose of the project was:
 To integrate the Character, Ethics and Leadership 
Programs
 To condense and simplify the ODS attribute list 
and identify those attributes most critical for 
success as a Junior Officer
 To determine which (ODS) attributes are being 
successfully instilled in our graduates  
 To determine how to “close the gap” between 
“present” and “desired”
 Make specific recommendations on the three 
programs (Athens, et al., 2005b, p.3)
The group of professors took the list of thirty-one 
graduate attributes and their subordinating elements 
identified by the 2004-2005 Officer Development System 
Project and attempted to determine how and when each 
attribute should be taught, and how to assess USNA’s 
ability to teach them. Working with five USNA Class of 2005 
graduates, the researchers graded the Academy’s
effectiveness of teaching each attribute and its elements. 
The research identified twenty-three elements that need 
greater attention and should be made a priority in the 
ODEV/PRODEV curricula, and the Leadership Continuum.  
According to those conducting the study, ten of the twenty-
three elements should be taught or emphasized in NL40X, 
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thus identifying the 1/C Capstone Course as a primary venue 
for revising, refining, and refreshing the Leadership 
Continuum (Athens, et al., 2005b).     
4. PRODEV/ODEV DMP/PMP Core Review Options
The second recent project relevant to the Academic 
Program review, ODEV/PRODEV curriculum restructuring, and 
NL40X is a brief to the Commandant of Midshipman that was 
composed by members of the ODEV and PRODEV Divisions.  
Members of these divisions were tasked with determining 
options for restructuring the ODEV/PRODEV core 
requirements.  Within a limit of eighteen credit hours, the 
two divisions sought to determine which PRODEV/ODEV courses 
should be mandatory (core) during a Midshipman’s eight 
semesters aboard USNA, and how to allocate credit hours 
between the two divisions and among their respective 
courses. 
A central component of the ODEV/PRODEV review of core 
courses was the assumption that the First Class Leadership 
Capstone courses will be divided between the two divisions, 
such that a two-hour laboratory period per week, and one 
course credit is allocated for PRODEV, and two lecture 
hours per week and two course credits are allocated for 
ODEV.  The PRODEV Practicum course would be designed to 
“prepare Midshipmen for the Fleet,” while the ODEV 
Leadership Capstone course would “culminate the USNA 
leadership experience” (Athens, et al., 2005b, p.4). 
Although changes to the leadership continuum would occur if 
any of the numerous options were adopted, this assumption 
would be the only direct impact to NL401.  To date, a final 
decision on which option to pursue has not been made.
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E. NL401, USNA SURFACE WARFARE LEADERSHIP CAPSTONE
The USNA Surface Warfare Leadership Capstone (NL401) 
is one of the most dynamic courses taught at USNA, and in 
order for USNA to remain the “premier institution for 
developing leaders of the Navy,” its potential must be 
maximized (Rempt, 2005c, p.5).  Due to the changing needs 
of the Fleet, the curriculum must be reviewed on a nearly 
continuous basis.  The Capstone is considered by many to be 
a “catch-all” for Surface Warfare and leadership topics not 
covered in the Leadership Continuum or those not covered in 
enough detail.  It is also a forum for soon-to-be Ensigns 
to ask questions to Surface Warfare Officers with Fleet 
experience.  Some individuals involved with the course see 
this as the most beneficial aspect of the course, because 
in less than six months Midshipmen in the course will be 
required to transition from life on the Yard, leading other 
Midshipmen, to life aboard ship leading a division of 
sailors.  The following quotation is the course description 
provided in the USNA course catalog:    
A course to provide information on the duties and 
responsibilities required of a junior officer in 
the surface community. Instruction includes 
operational procedures and practical applications 
of leadership and management principles tailored 
to the surface force. Lab includes training in 
shiphandling and bridge watchstanding skills 
through the use of YPs and simulation software
(USNA Academic Dean Website, 2006, p. 1, 
paragraph 6).
The next paragraph will elaborate on the current NL401 
curriculum, excluding the laboratory.
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1. NL401 Curriculum
NL401 is a three-credit course with four contact hours 
per week.  Two, one-hour blocks per week are allotted for 
lecture, accompanied by one day per week laboratory that is 
two hours in length.  The required topics are “officership, 
character, leadership, and surface warfare specific 
training/education” (Thomas, 2005, p.1). Desired topics are 
“ethics, the contemporary global environment, the future of 
the Surface Warfare Community, and other warfare 
communities” (p.1). The current course syllabus was 
designed by Dr. Joseph Thomas, Class of 1971 Distinguished 
Military Professor of Leadership, and the sponsor of this 
research.  He divided the course into two parts, the first 
titled “Perspectives on Officership,” which focused on the 
officership, character and leadership portions of the 
course, while the second was Surface Warfare Community-
specific. In part one, the first theme of the course is 
“Foundations of Officership.” This section of the course 
covers nine lessons, each corresponding to a chapter in The 
Armed Forces Officer.  The second theme in Part One is 
Joint Officership (three lessons), and the third is Naval 
Officership (three lessons). The warfare community-specific 
lessons are designed by a course coordinator from that 
respective community (Thomas, 2005).
According to LT Kelly Welsh, NL401 course coordinator, 
the classroom segment of the course uses “portions of the 
Division Officer’s Guide, Naval Officer Guide, and Watch 
Officer guide as text” (Welsh, personal communication, 
November 16, 2005).  To supplement these texts is a 
composition of material printed into text in 2005.  The 
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supplemental text covers eight lessons that are specific to 
Surface Warfare and managing a division aboard a ship, to 
include the following:
 Maneuvering Board Example [Closest Point of 
Approach (CPA)] 
 Maneuvering Board Example (course and speed)
 Maneuvering Board Example (changing station)
 Maneuvering Board Example (opening CPA) 
 NTP-3 GENADMIN Format 
 Enlisted Distribution Verification Report (EDVR) 
Breakdown 
 EDVR Sections 
 Pay Tables 
(Welsh, personal communication, November 16, 2005)
2. Potential NL401 Strengths and Weaknesses
In his role as overall NL40X coordinator, Dr. Joseph 
Thomas, solicited input from various NL40X stakeholders and 
compiled lists of strengths and weaknesses of the course.  
These strengths and weaknesses were published in his 2005 
course overview/syllabus. The following strengths were 
identified:
 NL 40X represents an opportunity to cover ethics, 
leadership, and character concepts not covered in 
previous courses.
 NL 40X represents an opportunity to cover warfare 
specific information to prepare MIDN for service 
in the fleet or operating forces of the Marine 
Corps.
 NL 40X synthesizes various ethics, leadership, 
and character concepts in a formal CAPSTONE 
conclusion to LEL core courses.
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 NL 40X provides MIDN an opportunity to 
demonstrate a thorough understanding of ethics, 
leadership, and character concepts covered in 
previous related courses.
 NL 40X is, perhaps, the most “practical” of 
courses MIDN will take while at the Academy.  It 
is comprised of lessons tailored to the needs of 
the Navy and Marine Corps.
The following were seen as weaknesses:
 There are too many “culminating” topics than can 
reasonably be covered in a single semester; 
choices must be made, subjectivity is 
unavoidable.
 Quality of instruction varies widely because of 
the use of adjunct instructors.
 Various warfare communities have dissimilar 
visions for balancing education and training.
 Various individuals have dissimilar visions for 
balancing education and training.
 Professional core competencies for basic (entry 
level) officers in the various communities vary 
greatly.
 The shift from NS 40X to NL 40X represents a 
change in focus and priority.  Change is 
generally accompanied by unintended consequences.
(Thomas, 2005, p. 1)
The goal of this research is to determine how NL401 should 
be structured so that the potential of the course is 
maximized and an appropriate balance is struck between the 
training and educational needs of SWO selected First Class 
Midshipmen; the strengths must be capitalized and the 
weaknesses eliminated or minimized. In order to accomplish 
this goal, and meet the needs of the Fleet, the Division 
Officer at Sea Program must be taken into consideration.  
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F. DIVISION OFFICER AT SEA PROGRAM (DOSP)
1. History and Background of DOSP
Surface Warfare Officer’s School Command was 
commissioned in 1970, and was responsible for initial 
accession training for all Surface Warfare Officers for 
over 30 years.  However, in 2001 the Surface Warfare 
community began to explore alternative training methods for 
their junior officers (JOs). A survey of over 2,000 JOs was 
conducted, and “only 24% of those surveyed felt that the 
Surface Warfare Officer School Command (SWOSCOLCOM) 
prepared them, or very well prepared them for their first 
at-sea division officer tour” (Gavino, 2002, p.1).  
Additionally, SWOSCOLCOM conducted a survey of year group 
(YG) 1998 Lieutenants, and determined that after qualifying 
as a Surface Warfare Officer, individuals remain at their 
initial sea tour for an average of only seven additional 
months.  The conclusion was that this severely restricted 
the amount of time allowed for newly qualified SWOs to hone 
their watch-standing skills, and to take advantage of 
leadership opportunities aboard their first ship (Gavino, 
2002, p.3).  
As a result of these surveys, and in an effort to 
reduce costs associated with the additional Permanent 
Change of Station (PCS) move to Newport, Senior SWO 
leadership determined that Junior Officers and the Surface 
Navy would benefit from Ensigns reporting to their first 
at-sea assignment immediately following commissioning.  
Beginning in January, 2003, instead of attending the four-
month SWOS Division Officer’s Course, Ensigns have been 
expected to complete a set of interactive, computer-based, 
course modules onboard their ship, qualify as an officer-
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of-the-deck, and then report to SWOS for a three-week 
Division Officer’s Course, which is meant to validate the 
computer-based training (CBT) (Vaas, 2004).
Therefore, Surface Warfare became the only warfare 
community in today’s Navy that does not have a “follow-on” 
school for its Ensigns.  The burden of preparing Ensigns 
for the first day aboard their ships, and their first 
impressions lies solely with their commissioning sources.  
a. SWOS Division Officer Course Curriculum
Prior to the implementation of DOSP, Ensigns were 
commissioned and reported directly to SWOSCOLCOM, Newport, 
RI for the Division Officers Course.  This course was 
intended to prepare them for service in the Fleet.  During 
their time in Newport “students learned Navigation, 
Administration, Weapons Systems, Damage Control, 
Engineering, and Basic Leadership” (Vaas, 2004, p.2).  The 
SWOSDOC curriculum consisted of “eleven weeks of Operation 
and Combat Systems fundamentals (PHASE I), six weeks of 
platform specific engineering training (PHASE II), and 
three to six weeks of billet specialty training (BST) 
(Makee, 1999, p.16). After completing the Division Officers 
Course, Ensigns would either undergo additional training 
for specific billet or ship-types or report to their first 
command.   
b. DOSP Modules/DOSP Curriculum
Under the Division Officer at Sea Program, all 
Surface Warfare selected Ensigns report directly from their 
commissioning source to their first at-sea command where 
they will begin their training and qualification track.  
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The following is an illustration of the typical Surface 
Warfare Officer training and qualification pipeline: 
Figure 1.  Current SWO Training and Qualification Pipeline
From (LaBarbera, 2005, p.2)
Ensigns report aboard their first ship and are allotted six 
to fifteen months to complete DOSP CBT modules and achieve 
their OOD qualification.  Once these requirements are met, 
they report to SWOSCOLCOM for the three-week Division 
Officer Course, return to their ship, and prepare for their 
Surface Warfare Officer Qualification board.  Once 
qualified, they remain onboard to complete their first 
twenty-seven month division officer tour (LaBarbera, 2005, 
p.2).
The computer based training (CBT) program is 
divided into modules designed to replace the classroom 
training provided during the five-month Division Officer 
Course.  These modules are downloadable CDs that cover 
administration; division officer fundamentals; navigation, 
seamanship, and shiphandling; combat systems/maritime 
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warfare; and engineering. The following is SWOSCOLCOM’s 
description of the ideal implementation of the program:
The training starts with "book-type" learning, 
where the trainee reads the theory or 
fundamentals about the topic. The Curriculum then 
sends the trainee away from the computer to 
accomplish practicums, where the trainee finds 
out how the given topics relates to his or her 
particular ship, and Practical Problems, which 
are scenario-type problems to further develop the 
trainee's understanding. Lastly are Case Studies, 
where trainees apply what they've learned and 
discovered to actual events (SWOS Division 
Officer Training Overview, 2006, p.1) 
Once these modules have been completed, prospective SWOs 
report to SWOSCOLCOM for the Division Officer Course.
The mission of SWOSDOC Division Officer Training 
Course is to:
Prepare OOD Underway qualified officers for SWO 
Qualification by immersing them in a 
collaborative, task based environment which will 
broaden each officer's professional knowledge 
base and reinforce fundamental principles and 
practices in accordance with existing 
instructions and policies (SWOSDOC Homepage, 
2006, p.1).
The Division Officer Course is considered a “leveling” 
course, intended to give DIVOs and opportunity to share 
their experiences and knowledge.  The course covers all 
aspects of Surface Warfare including technical knowledge, 
war fighting knowledge, shiphandling simulators and 
leadership.
2. Implications for Commissioning Sources and NL401
The implementation of the DOSP has obvious direct 
implications for commissioning sources, including the 
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United States Naval Academy.  The most obvious is that 
future Surface Warfare Officers are no longer afforded 
dedicated classroom time after commissioning to learn their 
profession.  Prior to reporting aboard their first ship, 
the responsibility for preparing an Ensign to lead a 
Division and perform their watchstanding and professional 
duties lies solely with their commissioning source.  Also, 
training with computer based training modules is completely 
up to the individual and his or her command. Another 
implication is that Ensigns must transition from being 
civilians or college and Service Academy students, to being 
a Division Officer in a span of days, not months.  The 
personal responsibilities and personal management skills 
obtained at SWOSDOC must be acquired somewhere else, either 
at the commissioning source or while in the Fleet. Lastly, 
personal networking opportunities provided at SWOSDOC are 
no longer available.  Ensigns must rely on personal 
associations and friendships acquired in college or prior 
to commissioning to share leadership and professional 
experiences.  
Thus, the implications for NL401 are also acute. The 
course is the only professional training course at the 
Naval Academy, and attempting to replace the material and 
experiences covered in five months at SWOSDOC with a one-
semester course curriculum is neither feasible nor useful.  
The requirements of the course as they relate to satisfying 
USNA’s mission and vision necessitate a highly efficient 
course curriculum that focuses on the needs of USNA and the 
Fleet.  To remain as the nation’s premier commissioning 
source for Surface Warfare Officers, NL401 must be 
structured such that its potential is maximized.     
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G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
During the 1998 strategic planning process, USNA 
stakeholders validated the institution’s mission, created a 
statement of strategic vision, and developed strategies for 
achieving its mission and vision.  In 2005, USNA 
Superintendent, Vice Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, recast the 
1998 Strategic Plan.  Additionally, he ordered an 
institution-wide academic program review intended to ensure 
USNA was meeting its mission and vision by effectively and 
efficiently graduating Officers who meet the requirements 
of the Navy and Marine Corps.  One element of this review 
involves exploring curriculum options related to the “core” 
academic and professional courses taught at the Naval 
Academy.  One of these courses is NL401, the Surface 
Warfare Officer Leadership Capstone.  These options in the 
context of changes resulting from the creation of Officer 
Development Division and the implementation of the Division 
Officer at Sea Program in 2003, make achieving the full
potential of NL401, as both a culminating leadership 
experience and practical training, critical to satisfying 
the mission and vision of the Naval Academy. The following 
chapter will explore published literature that relates to 
higher education practices, capstone courses, training and 
education, and conducting needs assessments. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine literature 
that will aid in identifying potential strengths and 
weaknesses of NL401, and the most effective and efficient 
way to assess the needs of the course.  First, this chapter 
reviews published literature and documents concerning 
topics related to higher education, and education and 
training in the military.  These topics include education 
versus training and capstone courses in undergraduate 
education.  Next, literature will be reviewed that explores 
proven methods used for conducting needs assessments and 
qualitative research.  Critical terminology will be adapted 
from, and defined using this literature.   Furthermore, 
parts of this literature will provide an accepted 
foundation for this research methodology, interview design, 
and interpretation of results.  
B. TRAINING VERSUS EDUCATION
Balancing the goals of ODEV and PRODEV Divisions is a 
central tenet to determining how NL40X and NL401 should be 
structured. The goals of ODEV Division are education 
oriented, while the goals of PRODEV are training oriented. 
Therefore, members of both divisions agreed on a vision 
statement for the course that touched on both training and 
education, but did not explicitly define these terms.  They 
state that the course is to serve as a culminating 
leadership, character, and warfare community-specific 
experience that will augment classroom instruction with 
laboratories.  In the case of NL401, these laboratories are 
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YPs and shiphandling simulators, intended to provide a pure 
training experience. The following paragraph elaborates on 
definitions of education and training.
The United States Marine Corps definitions of training 
and education are adopted for the purposes of this 
research, and used in the research design.  In his 1991 
Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1553.1B, the 29th Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, General Al Gray outlined his thoughts on the 
Marine Corps Training and Education System.  The following 
statement made by General Gray encapsulates the different, 
but necessarily complimentary goals of military training 
and education, and the value of properly balancing the two:
Training and education are important but 
different tools to be used in the development of 
an effective fighting force. Each complements the 
other and they are tightly interwoven at every 
level of professional development (Gray, 1991, 
p.1).
The following definitions of education and training are 
also provided in MCO 1553.1B, and are suitable for use in 
the context of NL401:
Education is the process of moral and mental 
development; the drawing out of students to 
initiate the learning process and bring their own 
interpretations and energies to bear, the product 
of which is a creative mind (Gray, 1991, p.1).
Training is defined as:
the conduct of instruction, discipline, or drill; 
the building in of information and procedures; 
and the progressive repetition of tasks, the 
product of which is skill development and 
proficiency (Gray, 1991, p.1).
Using education to produce creative minds through the 
process of moral and mental development, and training to 
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produce skill development and proficiency is fundamentally 
congruent with the NL401 vision.  However, for this thesis, 
developing creative minds and skill proficiency, will be 
replaced by analogous, more contemporary terms.  These 
terms are knowledge, skills, abilities, attitudes (KSAAs) 
and competencies, which will be defined further in this 
chapter.  Nonetheless, capturing these definitions of 
education and training will provide a foundation for 
exploring the needs of NL401, and for ensuring both the 
educational and training goals of the course are met.
C. CAPSTONE COURSES
The change of the NL401 vision from practicum to 
leadership capstone is a significant shift in philosophy 
that requires sound research and needs analysis to be 
structured and implemented effectively and efficiently. To 
determine how NL401 should be structured the advantages and 
disadvantages of various capstone course theories and 
structures must be explored.  The following paragraphs 
review literature pertaining to capstone courses in various 
college curricula.
1. Definition of Capstone
According to Fairchild and Taylor (2000), as cited in 
Sargent, Pennington, and Sitton (2003), a capstone course 
is, “a planned learning experience requiring students to 
synthesize previously learned subject matter content, and 
to integrate new information into their knowledge base for 
solving simulated real world problems” (Sargent, 
Pennington, and Sitton, 2003, p.2).  Fairchild and Taylor 
(2000) state “a capstone course should focus on integration 
of knowledge, facilitate meaningful closure, and provide 
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students with a contextual framework connecting theory and 
application based on their academic experiences and the 
connection among the disciplines, and the role of their 
profession in the outside world” (Sargent, et al., 2003, 
p.2). These definitions of capstone validate the NL40X 
vision as expressed in the Leadership Continuum, and 
provide grounds for applying capstone courses to academic 
curricula at USNA.  NL40X, as described by ODEV/PRODEV 
Divisions, seems to be the ideal venue for providing 
Midshipmen with a contextual framework for integrating 
leadership theory and application, and other leadership 
education and training experiences. However, two schools of 
thought exist regarding philosophies for implementation. 
2. Capstone Theory
At the heart of implementing a capstone course, lie 
two distinct, opposed, and legitimate philosophies. Robert 
Heinemann articulates the dilemma in his 1997 paper titled 
The Senior Capstone: Dome or Spire?.  According to 
Heinemann, capstone courses are most often intended to 
fulfill “a need for students to pull together all the ideas 
presented in different courses and construct some sort of 
integrated, meaningful whole” (Heinemann, 1997, p.3).  One 
goal of this process is to aid students in their pursuit of 
grasping a chosen discipline, and to help them to gain a 
sense of corporate identity (Heinemann, 1997).  However, he 
also notes that the end of the college experience does not 
signify an end to intellectual growth.  College graduates 
must be equipped with KSAAs that will prepare them to use 
their college experience as a jumping-off point for 
exploring new arenas.  Thus, the question becomes should a 
capstone be designed to provide closure (symbolized by a 
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dome) or further exploration (symbolized by a spire). 
Heinemann asks the following questions that are relevant to 
designing NL401:
1. Can a capstone provide both closure and further 
exploration?
2. Can both be accomplished in the time allotted?
3. Since the goals seem to move in opposite 
directions, is one cancelled out by including the 
other?
4. If we are forced to chose between the two, which 
should be emphasized?
(Cited: Heinemann, 1997, p.1)
Answers to these questions will be explored throughout this 
research and will serve as guidelines for formulating 
recommendations regarding the NL401 course structure.
a. The Case For and Against the Dome
The case for the dome is obvious and easily made.  
According to Heinemann, the first benefit of a capstone 
that provides closure is “practical necessity.”  Students 
in any discipline, including leadership, undergo varying 
instruction and experiences, and synthesize material in 
different ways.  A senior capstone is arguably the most 
effective way to level the playing field.  The second 
benefit of a dome is “market necessity.”  “Students 
themselves desire and need a sense of ‘what we have 
learned’” (Heinemann, 1997, p.7).  The third benefit is 
“semantic necessity.”  Heinemann states that “only 
integrated knowledge is meaningful,” and cites a 1991 study 
performed by the Association of American Colleges, that 
concluded that “the end of the major ought to be a time for 
integrating knowledge, concepts, and capacities from 
different parts of student’s learning experiences” (p.7).  
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The last benefit is “pragmatic necessity,” which is founded
on the belief that “only integrated knowledge is useful” 
(p.8).  By the end of their major, or leadership pipeline, 
students should be able to apply the knowledge and concepts 
that they learned to situations that are unfamiliar to 
them.  
Heinemann identifies three possible problems to a 
capstone that provides closure.  The first arises when the 
course focuses on reviewing previous material at the 
expense of integrating the material.  He states, “When this 
occurs we are left with a cheap rehash of content from 
other courses without an overall synthesis” (p.8). The 
second problem is the opposite of the first.  This occurs 
when the emphasis is placed in synthesis at the expense of 
reviewing prior course material. In this case, the “vision 
becomes so enlarged that it completely betrays the 
discipline” (p.10).  The third problem is the case-study 
syndrome, in which teachers and students become so focused 
on the minutiae of a problem that they find themselves 
exploring material that is beyond their area of expertise 
(p. 10). 
b. The Case For and Against the Spire
The case for the spire is not as obvious and 
easily made as that for the dome.  Heinemann states that 
the first advantage of a capstone that is designed to 
promote further exploration is “preparation for the real 
world of work.” In this capacity, a capstone course could 
ensure realistic expectations for what their first job will 
be like.  The second benefit is preparing students for a 
rapidly changing workplace.  Although Heinemann makes this 
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claim in the context of communication studies, it can 
easily be substantiated in other contexts, including modern 
Navy operations.  USNA students must be prepared to enter 
their profession as agents of the state, who operate in 
rapidly changing geo-political environments.  Furthermore, 
they must be prepared to be faced with unprecedented 
technological challenges and innovations, and 
organizational, procedural, and ideological change.  
Heinemann sums this point up by stating “how can we ignore 
these issues that make our texts and courses obsolete, 
sometimes before graduation” (p.11).  The third and last 
benefit of a spire is “preparation for citizenship.” 
Although the Naval Academy spends four years preparing its 
students for citizenship, the capstone remains a viable 
venue for ensuring students meet the moral and ethical 
standards expected of a USNA graduate serving in the Navy 
or Marine Corps.
Heinemann observes three problems involved with 
designing and implementing a spire.  The first occurs when 
instructors attempt to cover too much new material, or too 
many different things.  He notes that often, professors 
attempt to cover “everything important that was left out of 
the major or the core of the major” (p.16).  He states that 
this philosophy is unworkable because there within any 
course of study more is left out than is included. The 
second problem is that if the capstone overemphasizes 
practical material, the course becomes “petty and 
superficial” (p. 16).  He believes that even personally 
important subject matter should be left out of the course.  
The third problem with the spire occurs when the boundaries 
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of the discipline are breached:  “Getting off the subject 
is easier in the senior capstone course than any other 
course” (p.17). 
c. How to Make Capstone Work
According to Heinemann, most professional 
education literature indicates that a combination of 
closure and future exploration is desirable and achievable 
in capstone courses. He suggests that small colleges lean 
towards focusing on providing closure for its majors, but 
provides the following five practical steps that ease 
integrating the two philosophies:
 The major should have a complimentary entry 
course that prepares students for the entire 
major.
 Students should be required to retain all course 
material that pertains to their major.
 Students should be required to take a core survey 
course that covers humanistic and critical 
approaches to the discipline
 Capstone teachers must have access to the syllabi 
of all course in the major
 All students should be required to participate in 
an internship.
(Cited: p.18,19)
Many of these steps are met or exceeded in the USNA 
leadership continuum, and others can easily be implemented. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the dome and 
spire capstone philosophies will provide the theoretical 
framework to determine how NL401 should be structured.  
This literature also indicates that USNA’s leadership 
continuum sets the stage for a successful senior leadership 
capstone course; the foundation is already in place.  The 
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next step in this research is to identify the needs of the 
course.  What material must, should, and could be covered 
so that the course potential is maximized and the goals of 
the U.S. Navy, United States Naval Academy, faculty, staff, 
and Midshipmen are met?  This research will use an 
education and training needs assessment to answer these 
questions.    
D. NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Several models exist for developing a plan for 
educating and training those within an organization.  The 
most commonly accepted method is referred to as a needs 
assessment.  The needs assessment is the foundation on 
which an education and training system should be based 
(Newman, 2002).  NL401 is one element of an existing 
learning system designed to prepare Midshipmen to be 
Surface Warfare Officers, however no formal exploration 
into the needs of the course has been conducted.  This 
research will apply one proven needs assessment method to 
explore how the course should be structured to maximize its 
potential, meet training and educational goals, and 
consequently produce premier Surface Warfare Division 
Officers.  
Brinkerhoff and Gill (1994), as cited in Gupta (1999), 
describe a needs assessment as “a process for identifying 
the knowledge and skills necessary for achieving 
organizational goals” (Gupta, 1999, p.4). Needs assessments 
can also be described as both a process for identifying 
differences between desired and actual performance, and a 
method for identifying performance needs (Gupta, 1999).  
This research will attempt to accomplish both of these 
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objectives by qualitatively exploring desired and actual 
performance of recent USNA graduates who are in the Surface 
Fleet, and by attempting to identify present and future 
needs of the course.  Two proven methods of conducting 
needs assessments are training and educational needs 
assessments.  Since NL401 must be structured to both 
educate and train Midshipmen in their transition to the 
fleet, aspects of each method will be used for this 
research.
1. Training Needs Assessment
As cited in Gupta (1999), Allison Rossett (1987) 
states that “a gap between an optimal and actual situation 
results in discrepancies in performance” (Gupta, 1999, 
p.7).  Rossett believes that once there is the perception 
of a gap, conducting a training needs assessment is an 
effective and efficient way to close it.  Gupta further 
states that this type of needs assessment is the most 
appropriate method for “developing a training agenda, 
developing a specific training program (course/module), and 
developing a training curriculum” (Gupta, 1999, p.114).  
According to Rossett’s model, five types of information are 
collected during a training needs assessment:
 Optimal performance or knowledge.  
How performance should be.
 Actual or current performance or knowledge.  How 
performance is.
 Feelings of trainees and significant others.
How people feel about a problem.
 Causes of the problem from many perspectives.
Reasons for problems.
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 Solutions to the problem from many perspectives.
Ways to solve a problem. 
(Gupta, 1999, p.7)
This information is then processed and used to identify the 
KSAAs people need to be successful at their jobs, and the 
interventions that can achieve the desired state (Gupta, 
1999, p.115).
2. Educational Needs Assessment
The second type of needs assessment that will be used 
for this research is an educational needs assessment.  
According to W. James Popham, an “educational needs 
assessment is a technique for identifying those educational 
objectives that most need to be accomplished in a given 
instructional situation” (Popham, 1971-1972, p.22).  In 
Popham’s model, an educational need is defined as the 
difference between a desired learner outcome and the 
learner’s current status.  Once these needs are identified, 
they are then prioritized according to what stakeholders 
believe are most important.  The resulting curriculum is 
thereby designed to satisfy the most pressing needs of the 
students.  Popham also notes that this needs assessment 
model must be attentive to educational outcomes including, 
but not limited to those traditionally seen as intellectual 
accomplishments.  “All three domains of learner behavior; 
that is, the affective, the cognitive, and the 
psychomotor,” domains must be considered, where affective 
needs are “attitudinal, valuing or emotional,” cognitive 
needs refer to intellectual outcomes, and psychomotor needs 
refer to the learner’s physical and motor skills (p.23).  
Popham’s model presumes that the integration of 
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instructional objectives and related criterion measures 
with the judgments of those involved in designing, 
implementing, and teaching the curriculum will increase the 
quality of instruction by identifying the “educational 
objectives we really ought to be pursuing” (p.31).    
For the purposes of this research, Rossett’s training 
needs assessment model will be used, but adapted and 
modified to include the affective, cognitive, and 
psychomotor domains of learner behavior referenced in 
Popham’s educational needs assessment model.  This method 
will be used in this research to identify both the 
educational and training needs of NL401, and will hereon be 
referred to as simply a training needs assessment.  
According to Gupta (1999), there are several 
situations in which a training needs assessment should be 
used.  These situations include, “when a new system or 
technology must be implemented, when existing training 
programs must be revised or updated, and when new job 
responsibilities must be assumed by people” (Gupta, 1999, 
p.115).  The proposed changes to ODEV/PRODEV curricula, 
USNA core curriculum review, transitioning Midshipmen from 
USNA to the Fleet, and the implementation of the Division 
Officer at Sea Program all provide a context in which a 
training needs assessment is most useful. The precise model 
and methodology used in conducting this needs assessment of 
NL401 will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, 
Methodology.
E. KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, ABILITIES, ATTITUDES AND 
COMPETENCIES
To fulfill the mission and vision of the Naval Academy 
and meet the requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps, the 
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USNA academic, professional, and athletic programs must 
instill knowledge, skills, abilities, attitudes, and 
competencies in its graduates that will serve Midshipmen as 
they transition to service in the Fleet (Thomas, 2005, 
p.1).  Defining and identifying these requirements are a 
primary step in determining the needs of NL401. The 
following paragraphs review literature related to these 
terms, which will aid in adapting definitions of each that 
are appropriate to this research and NL401.
1. Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Attitudes 
(KSAAs)
Several similar definitions of KSAAs exist among 
academic literature.  Muchinsky, as cited in Newman (2002), 
refers to knowledge as “the body of information that 
enables adequate job performance; skill refers to 
operational abilities, often in terms of psychomotor 
abilities, and ability refers to those cognitive 
capabilities required by a job” Muchinsky does not address 
attitudes in his model. (Newman, 2002, p.14). The accepted 
Department of Defense (DoD) definitions of these terms are 
outlined in the Joint Competencies Leader Development 
Framework, and are presented in the following table:
United States Joint Forces Command Definitions of
Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Attitudes
Knowledge: Describes a body of information, usually of a 
factual or procedural nature, applied directly 
to the performance of a functional task.
Skill: The ability to perform a certain physical or 
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mental task.  Describes a present, observable 
competence to perform a learned act (could be 
psychomotor, motor, and/or cognitive)
Ability: Describes a general, more enduring trait or 
capability an individual possesses at the time 
when he/she begins to perform a task.
Attitude: Describes an internal state that influences an 
individual’s choices or decisions to at in a 
certain way under particular circumstances.
Cited: After (Newlon, 2004, p. 21)
Table 5.  USJFCOM KSAA Definitions
Thus, Muchinsky’s definitions of these terms are compatible 
with those published by DoD.  For the purposes of this 
research, Muchinsky’s definitions will be used, along with 
DoD’s definition of attitude. 
This research seeks to identify KSAAs required of 
Junior Surface Warfare Officers, structure the NL401 
curriculum accordingly, and meet USNA’s vision of producing 
Junior Officers who are better equipped for service in the 
Surface Fleet than their peers. However, it is possible to 
teach these KSAAs throughout the leadership pipeline, 
commission Ensigns and Second Lieutenants who possess them, 
and still fail to meet the vision.  To maximize the 
potential of the leadership pipeline and NL401, and achieve 
USNA’s vision, we must identify groups of KSAAs that 
correlate to superior performance.  The following 
paragraphs review literature that defines core 
competencies, explores the relationship between KSAAs and 
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core competencies, and provides core competency models, 
which will be integrated and used in research design and 
analysis.   
2. Competencies
In her 2002 thesis titled Core Competency Needs 
Analysis for U.S. Naval Reserve Training and Administration 
of Reserve (TAR) Officers, Carol Newman notes that in most 
training literature the terms Knowledge, Skills, and 
Abilities (KSAs); and competencies are synonymous.  
However, she states that some literature identifies core 
competencies as KSAs that separate high performance from 
mediocrity.  Parry (1998) uses the terms skills and 
abilities interchangeably, and expands of these two 
definitions by stating that a competency is a “cluster of 
related knowledge, attitudes and skills that affects a 
major part of one’s job; that correlates with performance 
on the job; that can be measured against well-accepted 
standards; and that can be improved via training and 
development” (Parry, 1998, p.60).  He goes on to describe 
competencies as “generic” and “universal,” and skills as
very specific and used only in certain situations.  He 
states that competencies for managers and leaders can be 
categorized into four groups that are outlined in the 
following table:
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Scott R. Parry’s Four Competency Groups
Administrative - Time management and prioritizing
- Setting goals and standards
- Planning and scheduling work
Communication - Listening and organizing
- Giving clear information
- Getting unbiased information
Supervisory - Training, coaching, and delegating
- Appraising people and performance
- Disciplining and counseling
Cognitive - Identifying and solving problems
- Making Decisions, weighing risks
- Thinking clearly and analytically
Source: After (Parry, 1998, p.62)
Table 6.  Four Competency Groups
Parry’s definition of competencies will be adopted and used 
in this research.  These four core competency groups are 
congruent with the Center for Naval Leadership’s (CNL) 
Competency Model, which identifies five core competencies 
for Naval Leaders.  CNL’s five core competencies are, 
“accomplish the mission, leading people, leading change, 
working with people, and resource stewardship” (Center for 
Naval Leadership Competency Model, 2003). Thus, Parry’s 
four core competency groups and their subordinate 
competencies are used in designing interview and focus 
group formats for this research.  Components of these 
groups will be prioritized according to the perceived 
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importance of the NL401 stakeholders, which will help 
identify educational and training needs of NL401, and how 
the course should be structured.
To achieve its vision of remaining the premier 
commissioning source for Surface Warfare Officers, USNA 
must graduate officers who possess clusters of KSAs 
(competencies) that correlate to high performance during 
their first Division Officer tours.  NL401 is an 
appropriate venue for ensuring this objective is met, and 
assessing the needs of the course is critical to the Naval 
Academy’s success.     
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to review published 
literature that will provide a logical and effective 
framework for exploring the needs of NL401, and 
consequently how the course should be structured.  First, 
relevant, accepted definitions of training and education 
were presented.  These concise definitions provide a basis 
for designing interview and focus group questions that does 
not confuse the two terms.  Second, literature pertaining 
to college-level capstone courses and theory were 
presented.  This literature provides a framework for 
exploring how to effectively and efficiently implement 
NL401, and problems that may be encountered with capstone 
courses.  It also provides guidance for interpreting 
results and questions that will aid in making 
recommendations for course structure.  Next, literature 
relating to educational and training needs assessments was 
presented, and a training needs assessment model was 
adapted and modified to accommodate the educational needs 
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of NL401.  This literature provides a foundation for the 
research methods that will be implemented for use in this 
needs assessment. Finally, critical terms associated with 
needs assessments were defined, and a model consisting of 
four core leadership and management competency groups was 
adopted.  This model will be used in research design, 
interpretation of results, and in making recommendations
for the NL401 course structure. The following chapter will 
expand on several of these concepts as they relate to the 




The purpose of this chapter is to provide a thorough 
discussion of the methodology used in the collection and 
analysis of data used in this thesis.  First, a general 
discussion regarding qualitative research will be provided.  
Next, the training needs assessment model that was adopted 
from previously discussed literature, and used in this 
research, will be discussed in detail.  Then a description 
of the study participants will be provided.  Finally, 
methods for collecting and analyzing data will be 
presented.    
B. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
This researcher has chosen to examine qualitative data 
to explore the training and educational needs of NL401, and 
how this capstone course should be structured.  According 
to Babbie, as cited in Newman (2002), “quantitative 
research, such as conducting a survey, is very appropriate 
when the information sought can be transformed into a 
standard, somewhat inflexible, structured questionnaire, 
which can be repeatedly administered to obtain quantitative 
data, such as frequencies and means” (Newman, C., 2002, 
p.15). The advantages of quantitative data are that large 
survey groups can be easily reached at a low cost, and the 
data can usually be processed to produce concise, easily 
understood results.  However, quantitative research may not 
be appropriate, when the researcher does not have a 
preconceived idea of what answers to each survey question 
may look like.  “If the potential answers have not yet been 
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determined, that is, if a model of the phenomenon under 
study has not yet been developed, then qualitative research 
can be an appropriate method of gathering data to build 
such a model” (p.15). Although results from qualitative 
research cannot be easily reduced to numbers, data gathered 
is valid and rich in content. 
In the case of NL401, a comprehensive research project 
that includes inputs from all stakeholders has not yet been 
performed.  Therefore, no model currently exists for what 
the course should really be teaching, or how the course 
should be structured.  Additionally, a standardized method 
for evaluating future performance of NL401 students has not 
been established.  Therefore, a qualitative needs 
assessment is appropriate for this research. 
There are several methods for conducting qualitative 
research.  The two most popular and accepted methods for 
gathering qualitative data are interviews and focus groups, 
both of which will be used in this research.  Interviews 
most often focus on gathering data from elite stakeholders 
who are assumed to be subject matter experts, while focus 
groups tend to concentrate on policy-oriented research 
(Harrell, 2005, p.2).  The following paragraphs will expand 
on the interview and focus group methods employed in this 
research. 
There are several factors to be considered when 
conducting interviews.  The first factor is the amount of 
control the researcher wishes to exercise over his or her 
respondents.  When placed on a continuum, the amount of 
control increases from informal to unstructured, semi-
structured, and, lastly, structured interviews (Harrell, 
2005, p.4). This research will employ semi-structured 
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interviews.   This means the researcher has a list of 
things he or she wants to figure out from the opinions and 
knowledge of experts (Harrell, 2005, p.4-5).  The next 
factor to be considered is how a sample of respondents will 
be accessed.  This research employed both judgment and 
convenience samples.  A judgment sample involves the 
collection of data from individuals the researcher believes 
have expert knowledge and/or unique points of view on the 
subject, and a convenience sample is taken from individuals 
who are easily accessed, but about whom the researcher has 
only basic background information. 
Focus groups are the second method of data collection 
employed in this research.  The purpose of focus groups is 
to incite dynamic verbal and non-verbal discussion between 
the facilitator and respondents, and among the respondents.  
They can be used during various phases of research, which 
include testing survey questions and developing word 
choice, and exploring why people feel a certain way 
(Harrell, 2005, p.30).  Focus groups were employed for both 
purposes during this research.  The composition of 
interview and focus group samples will be explained in 
detail later in this chapter.  In the following paragraphs 
the training needs assessment model used for this research 
will be presented. 
C. TRAINING NEEDS ASSESSMENT MODEL
Allison Rossett’s model for conducting a training 
needs assessment, cited in Gupta (1999), will be used in 
this research, and adapted to explore the educational needs 
of NL401.  This portion of Chapter Four will outline the 
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precise model used for this research.  Rossett’s model is 
comprised of five phases of research.
Phase one of Rossett’s model involves gathering 
preliminary data regarding the training needs of the target 
group; in this case the training and educational needs of 
NL401 students.  The first step in this preliminary 
analysis is to poll clients, senior managers, end users, 
subordinates, and/or functional heads or managers of the 
target audience, to gather background information on the 
problem (Gupta, 1999).  For this study, background 
information was gathered from the overall NL40X course 
coordinator, NL401 course coordinator, and the ODEV/PRODEV 
sponsored studies cited in Chapter Two.  The next step of 
phase one is to use the background information to establish 
the goals of the assessment, to include the purpose and
scope of the project (Gupta, 1999).  The purpose and scope 
of this project are outlined in Chapter One.
Phase two of Rossett’s model is the planning phase.  
During this phase, the researcher determines the type of 
data to be used, the sources of data, and tools that can be 
used to collect the data (Gupta, 1999).  Because this 
research seeks to explore ways to restructure an existing 
training and education program, Rossett recommends 
including “the target audience, subject-matter experts, 
supervisors, and other related internal and external 
customers,” in the data collection process (Gupta, 1999, 
p.121).  Using these recommendations and guidelines, it was 
determined that this research  would target, USNA faculty 
and staff involved in the teaching and administration of 
NL401; former NL401 students; and the external customer, 
the operational Surface Warfare Officer community. Also 
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during this phase, it was determined that focus groups and 
interviews would be the most appropriate tools for 
gathering data.
Phase three of Rossett’s model consists of developing 
research tools and gathering data.  It is during this phase 
of this needs assessment that the interview and focus group 
protocol was generated.  First, a pilot protocol was 
created for use during focus group one, which was comprised 
of sixteen NL401 instructors.  Next, the focus group was 
conducted, the results analyzed, and a tentative, semi-
structured interview format was generated.  Additionally, 
the pilot focus group helped to identify potential biases 
that could be corrected for by careful question design.  It 
was during this phase that the educational needs of NL401 
were addressed, and incorporated into this training needs 
assessment model. Next, minor changes to the tentative 
protocol were made after a pilot interview was held with a 
post-command Commander (O-5). Finally, convenience and 
judgment samples of study participants were identified, and 
will be outlined in the next portion of this chapter.
Phase four of this model involves analyzing the data.  
During this phase, all focus group and interview data were 
be transcribed and coded.  The data were coded according to 
several themes.  These code groups include stakeholder 
perceptions of current SWO JO performance, perceptions of 
optimal SWO JO performance, opinions of whether NL401 can 
address the gap between training and educational 
expectations and performance, perspectives of core SWO JO 
competencies, and finally, general stakeholder perspectives 
on how the USNA SWO Leadership Capstone course should be 
structured. This data, will then be presented and Phase 
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five of this needs assessment will begin. During phase 
five, findings, conclusions and recommendations on how 
NL401 should be structured to maximize this educational and 
training opportunity were made.  The following portion of 
this chapter provides a detailed discussion on the 
selection of participants used in this study.      
D. STUDY PARTICIPANTS
The objective for selecting participants for this 
study was to target all stakeholder groups who are directly 
touched by NL401 and/or who are directly impacted by its 
effectiveness.  Stakeholders were divided into two groups 
according to their association with the course.  Internal 
stakeholders, those employed at USNA in the ODEV or PRODEV 
Divisions, were separated into two groups.  Group one 
consisted of active-duty Surface Warfare Officers currently 
serving as NL401 instructors and/or administrators 
(PRODEV).   Group two consisted of a panel of ODEV 
Distinguished Military Professors (DMPs) and Permanent 
Military Professors (PMPs); a mix of active-duty Navy and 
retired military faculty members who have academic 
backgrounds in education.  External stakeholders were 
divided into two groups based on operational experience.  
Group one consisted of a sample of Surface Warfare Officers 
whose operational experience ranged from post-division 
officer to post-command.  Group two was comprised entirely 
of 2005 USNA graduates who were enrolled in the SWOS 
Division Officer Course. When selecting group one external 
stakeholder participants, care was taken to screen subject 
groups that would achieve proportionality in ship type 
experience, gender, homeport, and former billet 
assignments. With the exception of the DMPs, all 
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participants were active duty Surface Warfare Officers who 
have served aboard ships with Ensigns who have graduated 
from the Naval Academy, and who have extensive exposure to 
the Division Officer at Sea Program during recent at-sea 
assignments.  Table 7 is an illustration of the NL401 
stakeholders who were targeted in data collection:
NL401 Stakeholder Map





NL401 Instructors Former COs, Prospective COs, 
Prospective XOs, Prospective 
Department Heads
ODEV Faculty:
DMPs and PMPs 
2005 USNA Graduates currently 
serving as SWOs
Table 7.  NL401 Stakeholder Map
The following paragraphs will elaborate on the composition 
of each of the four stakeholder groups, and the chosen 
method for obtaining data from each.
1. Composition of Internal NL401 Stakeholders
a. NL401 Instructors
The initial focus group for this research was 
comprised of sixteen NL401 instructors.  All members of 
this focus group were active-duty, Surface Warfare Officers 
who are stationed at USNA.  Fourteen instructors were 
members of the Professional Development Division, and two 
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were Company Officers serving on the Commandant’s Staff.  
The rank composition of the group was as follows: thirteen 
Lieutenants, two Lieutenant Commanders, and one Lieutenant 
Junior Grade.  All but two members were male, and all 
members reported to USNA within the last three years, 
therefore all had operational exposure to the Division 
Officer at Sea Program.  Operational experience ranged from 
three and one-half years to eighteen years.  Members of the 
group served on all ship types, in all USN homeports, and 
served in every Junior Officer at-sea billet including 
nuclear power billets.  Two of the members completed two 
Department Head tours, three of members were prior 
enlisted, and ten of the sixteen were USNA graduates. 
Included in the group was the NL401 course coordinator, who 
is responsible for designing course material.
b. ODEV Faculty: DMPs and PMPs
The second focus group held with internal 
stakeholders was comprised of six ODEV DMPs and PMPs, the 
Chairman of the Leadership Ethics and Law Department, and 
three researchers.  These individuals are responsible for 
much of the background information provided in Chapter One 
of this thesis, and are engaged in curriculum design and 
implementation within the ODEV Division.  All respondents 
hold master’s degrees, and all but two respondents hold 
doctors of philosophy.  Two respondents are serving on 
active duty, three are retired military officers, one is 
serving in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve as a Colonel, and 
all have experienced command in the U.S. Military.         
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2. Composition of External NL401 Stakeholders
a. Surface Warfare Officers: Fleet Leadership
The first targeted group of external stakeholders 
was active-duty Surface Warfare Officers of the rank of 
Lieutenant (O-3) or higher, who have served in the Fleet 
for at least two Division Officer tours.  Interview 
subjects were selected to achieve proportionality in 
gender, ship-type experience, homeports, and billets held. 
This group was divided into four sub-groups according to 
experience level.  Table 8 illustrates the composition of 
each sub-group:
Surface Warfare Officer Leadership: Composition of 
Interview Subjects










6 5 Male/1 Female
Prospective XOs 
(PXOs) (O-4)




6 5 Male/1 Female
Table 8.  Composition of Surface Warfare Officer Leadership 
Interview Subjects
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The PCO and PXO respondent groups were selected as 
convenience samples from students enrolled in various 
curricula at Surface Warfare Officer School Command 
(SWOSCOLCOM) in Newport, RI.  The post-command and 
Prospective Department Head respondents were selected as 
judgment samples from individuals stationed at SWOSCOLCOM 
and at USNA.  All members were evaluated as having expert 
knowledge on core competencies of SWO Ensigns and adequate 
exposure to the Division Officer at Sea Program.     
b. Surface Warfare Officers: 2005 USNA Graduates
The second group of external stakeholders was 
comprised of six, 2005 USNA graduates who are serving as 
Division Officers in the Surface Fleet.  These respondents 
were taken as a convenience sample from students enrolled 
in the three-week Division Officers Course at SWOSCOLCOM.  
Five respondents were male, one was female, two were 
serving aboard ships homeported in Norfolk, two in San 
Diego, one in Pearl Harbor, and one in Yokosuka, Japan. The 
following paragraphs will outline the tools used for 
collecting and analyzing data.
E. TOOLS USED FOR COLLECTING AND ANALYZING DATA
The tools used for collecting and analyzing data for 
this research were focus groups and semi-structured 
interviews.  Prior to each data collection event a brief 
introduction was given.  The purpose of the introduction 
was to introduce the purpose and benefits of the research, 
topics that would be discussed, and to attempt to minimize 
biases associated with each respondent group or individual.  
The researcher assumed that active duty Surface Warfare 
Officers serving in the Fleet would be more inclined to
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focus on the training goals of NL401, while respondents 
associated with the design, implementation and 
administration of NL401 would be more inclined to focus on 
both the education and training goals of the course.  Thus, 
during the introduction, the stage was set using the 
following statement:
USNA, with its faculty and staff, is suited for 
both the practical training and the education of 
its midshipmen.  Through the previously discussed 
leadership continuum, midshipmen are exposed to 
many leadership, character, ethical, and 
professional development opportunities during 
their four years at Annapolis.  The First Class 
capstone course is a three-credit hour, four-
contact-hour course that is intended to serve as 
a culminating experience in the areas of 
leadership, character and warfare community 
specific development.  It is also important to 
note that this is the last dedicated classroom 
time before Midshipmen are commissioned Ensigns, 
and report to their first seagoing command. 
After setting the stage, each focus group and interview 
subject was asked the same set of five initial questions.  
However, questions were phrased according to the 
respondent’s background and experience level.  Appendix A 
provides the interview protocol.  The researcher then 
probed the respondents to incite further, more detailed 
commentary as necessary.  Each interview was scheduled for 
forty-five minutes, each focus group was scheduled for one 
hour, and each event was recorded using a digital voice 
recorder.  Following the question and answer portion, each 
respondent was given a pre-formatted survey sheet for 
collecting demographic information.  The sheet also 
contained each initial question, and space for the 
respondents to summarize their comments if they felt 
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compelled to do so.  The following paragraph discusses the 
focus group and interview protocol in detail. 
The first question was intended to –solicit? 
commentary on what respondent groups believe the purpose of 
NL401 should be.  In other words, the researcher was trying 
to explore what respondents believe should be the 
difference between a Midshipman on day one of the course 
and an Ensign at commissioning that can be attributed to 
NL401.  Probes following this question were primarily 
directed towards extracting thoughts on balancing the 
training of hard skills versus teaching soft skills such as 
leadership techniques in the Surface Navy, moral and 
ethical case studies, critical thinking, professional 
writing, and geo-political considerations, to name a few.
The second question was intended to explore thoughts 
and opinions regarding the delineation of training and 
education responsibilities between the Fleet and 
commissioning sources.  The question was presented as if 
both the Fleet and USNA were ultimately responsible for 
preparing Division Officers and ensuring their future 
success.  However, due to the scope of this mandate, some 
compromises may have to be reached.  If this is the case, 
where should or could the line be drawn?
The third question was more directed than the first 
two.  The intention of the third question was to explore 
thoughts and opinions of critical deficiencies in Ensigns 
reporting to their first ship, and whether or not they can 
be addressed in NL401.  Probes for this question were 
intended to extract information that would help identify 
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and differentiate between common, poignant, training 
deficiencies, character deficiencies, and education 
deficiencies.
The purpose of question four was to extract 
stakeholder opinions regarding core Surface Warfare Officer 
KSAAs.  This question was intended to pull out core 
competencies, and primarily training oriented data.  
Respondents were asked to list and describe the KSAAs and 
attempt to prioritize them according to importance.
The final question in the interview and focus group 
protocol was intended to gather information regarding the 
Division Officer at Sea program.  This question was 
purposefully left until the end, because each preceding 
question and probes helped set the stage for gaining 
insight into the thoughts and opinions of what the 
educational goals of NL401 should be.  This researcher 
believes that leaving the question until the end helped 
minimize the biases associated with the Division Officer at 
Sea Program.  Respondents were asked whether or not they 
have noticed any recent trends in JO performance, positive 
or negative, that can be attributed to the program.  Probes 
were then initiated to incite further, detailed discussion, 
and to determine if NL401 could minimize deficiencies 
and/or maximize the positive effects.          
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to provide detailed 
discussion on the methodology used in this research that 
will set the stage for the presentation of data.  First, 
discussion regarding general qualitative research was 
provided. Next, the training needs assessment model used in 
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this research was described in detail.  Allison Rossett’s 
model was used but was adapted to accommodate the 
educational needs and goals of NL401. Next, a detailed 
description of focus group and interview participants, and 
methods for identifying respondents was provided. Finally, 
the interview and focus group protocols used in this 
research were presented.  
The following chapter will present the data that were 
gathered during this research.  The recorded interviews and 
focus groups were transcribed and coded according to 
general themes that were noted during data collection.  
These themes include educational needs of NL401, training 
needs, SWO Ensign KSAAs and core competencies, ways in 
which NL401 can be structured to maximize course potential 
and improve the quality of USNA graduates serving in the 
Surface Navy, and ways in which NL401 can close the gap 





The purpose of this chapter is to present the results 
of the focus groups and interviews. Each digital recording 
was transcribed, and the data coded according to 
discernible, repetitive themes and sub-themes relevant to 
this research.  During discussion of each theme and sub-
theme, examples of commentary will be presented, and 
previously discussed literature relating to education and 
training and capstone courses may be drawn upon to further 
illustrate common ideas.  The data presented in this 
chapter will then be used to draw conclusions about 
training and educational needs, and make recommendations 
for improving the structure of NL401.  The chapter will be 
organized into five sections; historical perspective, 
stakeholder perceptions of training needs, perceptions of 
educational needs, a prioritization of SWO JO KSAAs and 
competencies, and data relating to stakeholder 
recommendations for structuring the course. 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE IMPACT OF THE FIVE-MONTH 
SWOS ON SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER PERFORMANCE
The open-ended questions asked at the beginning of 
interviews and focus groups often initiated comments 
regarding the implementation of the DOSP.  Although much of 
this type of data was dismissed as being outside the scope 
of this research, some comments were useful in putting the 
expectations of Junior Officers who fall under DOSP into a 
historical context.  Data suggests that a majority of those 
interviewed do not view their attending the five-month SWOS 
as having a significant, positive, impact on their careers.  
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Instead, it seems that most respondents attribute their 
high performance to experiences such as Midshipman summer 
cruise, mentorship from a superior or Senior Enlisted, and 
education and training by their commissioning source.    
The following statements made by Commanders who are 
prospective commanding officers, illustrate opinions 
regarding expectations of Junior Officers prior to the 
implementation of the DOSP:
(1) I went to SWOS for six months and then I went 
to a follow-on comm school for four weeks.  But I 
don’t think I was a contributor on the ship until 
after being onboard for at least a year.  And 
when I say contributor, I mean stand-alone, they 
could leave me alone to do things…and that was 
with six months of SWOS.
(2) I went to SWOS in San Diego, a long time ago, 
and I was convinced that I would show up to my 
ship and know everything about being a DIVO and 
ship driver.  But when I got there, I realized 
that only a small part of what I learned actually 
transferred to my job.  There were still a lot of 
tools I didn’t have...and I mean professional 
tools, like systems knowledge and stuff, but 
leadership tools too. And it took awhile for me 
to be an effective Division Officer…When I look 
back I don’t know if my time at SWOS really had 
an impact on my career.  If I had not gone to 
SWOS, I feel like I would still be where I am 
today.
A Prospective Executive Officer said:
(3) I haven’t drank the kool aid yet as far as 
Division Officer at Sea being a success. But, I 
don’t think it is a failure either.  I mean six 
months of SWOS was excessive and mostly a waste 
of time…I don’t know what the right answer is. I 
think that circumstances are improving for the 
new program to work…I think we will eventually 
see positive results.
Prospective Department Heads said:
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(1)I don’t know about SWOS…I don’t think I 
learned much in my six months.  I was just 
waiting to go to my ship…I learned more on my 
Midshipman cruise between my junior and senior 
year, about ships.  I got a lot of conning time 
and experiences…
(2) I felt lost when I checked onboard and I went 
to SWOS…I was lucky to have a good Department 
Head who taught me a lot about my job.  He really 
helped me learn how to be a successful Division 
Officer and OOD, and spent time developing all of 
the DIVO and bridge skills…If it wasn’t for that, 
I think I would be in the same shoes as the new 
guys that I saw…Department Head leadership and 
involvement in the program (DOSP) made all the 
difference.
These sentiments were echoed by all former COs and PCOs, 
all prospective Executive Officers, two-thirds of 
prospective Department Heads, and only four out of sixteen 
NL401 instructors. Additionally, nearly all active-duty 
respondents specifically cited taking advantage of summer 
cruise as the experience that enabled them to initially 
outperform their peers in the Fleet; not their performance 
at SWOS.  Therefore, data suggest that Junior Officers 
today should be able to approach the levels of performance 
demonstrated by those who attended a five-month SWOS course 
of instruction. The next section of this chapter is 
dedicated to presenting data that relate to current 
perceptions of JO performance expectations, and the 
training needs of future Surface Warfare Officers enrolled 
in NL401.
C. STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF TRAINING NEEDS
This portion of this research shows the stakeholder 
perceptions of training needs of Midshipmen enrolled in 
NL401.  Here it is important to clarify what the researcher 
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considers training needs.  Based on the literature review 
and supported by data collected, the term “training needs” 
is defined as those skill and knowledge requirements that 
are acquired through progressive repetition of tasks that 
build upon information and procedures to create 
proficiency.  Knowledge and skills acquired through 
training are oftentimes easily measured through the use of 
established evaluation criteria; performance evaluation of 
skills taught through training is usually black and white. 
For the purposes of this research a distinction is 
made between SWO Junior Officer (JO) training needs 
relating to performing the duties of a Division Officer, 
and those needs associated with performing watchstanding 
duties on the bridge of a warship.  This is done so that 
the themes identified in this research can be better 
organized, and because of the dual roles SWO JOs are 
expected to perform during their Division Officer tours.  
Ensigns reporting to their commands are expected to 
contribute to their ship’s mission by leading and managing 
a Division, and by standing watches on the bridge.  
As Division Officers, Junior Officers are responsible 
for the people, equipment, spaces, and procedures 
associated with their particular job assignment.  To 
provide further clarification and distinction, the Division 
Officer training needs outlined in this chapter will be 
associated with management, instead of leadership 
functions.  These terms are often confused so the following 
definitions are provided.  Leadership is commonly 
understood as being related to providing vision and 
enthusiasm to influence people to willfully effect and 
embrace change. Management is concerned with the effective 
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and efficient operation and use of resources within an 
established organizational system.  Some common, historical 
examples of Division Officer training needs for Surface 
Warfare Ensigns are understanding the organization of their 
ship, understanding the operation of their equipment, 
knowledge of relevant policies, maintenance and material 
management (3M), personnel system knowledge and management, 
and professional writing.  
As watchstanders, Junior Officers are expected to 
manage their bridge watchteam and resources, demonstrate an 
ability to safely navigate the ship during routine 
operations, and ultimately qualify as an Officer of the 
Deck (OOD) underway. Examples of watchstanding training 
needs are maneuvering boards, navigation principles, 
standard shiphandling commands, radio telephone (RT) 
procedures, basic engineering principles, and rules of the 
road.  
Training requirements for both Division Officer and 
bridge watchstanding knowledge and skill sets may vary 
between ship-types and command preferences.  However, data 
gathered from respondents with diverse operational 
backgrounds supports the assumption that they are 
negligible.  Therefore, for the purposes of this research, 
the skill and knowledge requirements identified as training 
needs are assumed to be universal among SWO Junior 
Officers.
The following paragraphs will outline common themes 
identified in this research that help to explore the
relationship between expected and actual performance of 
Surface Warfare Junior Officers in the Fleet, and the 
training needs associated with improving NL401 and SWO 
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Junior Officer performance.  Using the training needs 
assessment model outlined in chapter four, these paragraphs 
will provide discussion relating to optimal and actual 
performance, feelings about training-related performance 
problems, whether or not there is a gap between optimal and 
actual performance, sources of performance problems related 
to training, and whether or not NL401 is an appropriate and 
practical venue for addressing the training needs 
identified.
Data for this portion of the research were gathered 
from interviews and focus groups consisting of active-duty 
Surface Warfare Officers. The most common questions used to 
solicit responses pertaining to this topic were:
1. What do you believe the purpose of NL401 should 
be?
2. Can you identify any common, significant 
deficiencies in Division Officers you have served 
with?
3. With regards to SWO JO training, can you draw a 
distinction between the responsibilities of their 
first command and their commissioning source?
4. Is there any particular knowledge or skill area 
that you believe USNA did not adequately prepare 
you? 
Respondent data indicate consistent performance 
expectations and perceived training needs among the SWO 
leadership groups.  All respondents and/or groups of 
respondents cited both Division Officer and watchstanding 
knowledge and skill training needs, and many needs were 
repeatedly mentioned.  The following noticeable trends 
emerged:
75
 The Fleet expects Ensigns to be Division Officers 
the day they arrive onboard their first ship.  
Fleet leadership expects them to be trained and 
proficient in several management functions.
 Higher echelon Fleet leaders seemed to place 
Division Officer training needs at a higher 
priority than watchstanding training needs. COs, 
PCOs, and PXOs unanimously stated that it is 
their responsibility to train JOs in maritime 
skills, and have a strong desire to do so.
 NL401 instructors and prospective Department 
Heads (all Lieutenants) seemed to place 
watchstanding training needs at a higher priority 
than Division Officer training needs, and 
concentrated their discussion accordingly.
The following paragraphs outline themes relating to 
Division Officer training needs, and themes relating to 
bridge watchstanding training needs
1. Division Officer Training Needs
The following data collected from active duty 
respondents illustrate the ways in which Ensigns reporting 
to their first ship are expected to initially contribute. 
Among former COs, PCOs and PXOs, there was unanimous 
agreement that Ensigns reporting to their first ship are 
expected to effectively perform as Division Officers, and 
possess the knowledge and skill requirements associated 
with managing a division. One former Commanding Officer 
said:
As the instruction says, the program (DOSP) is 
meant to have officers step onboard and be 
Division Officers.  I think the first thing they 
need to know, they don’t need to know how to be 
OODs yet, because they are going to be trained to 
do that…We are going to make them Division 
Officers. 
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One prospective Executive Officer remarked:
From what I have seen and heard, ships are 
getting onboard with it (DOSP)…As long as DIVOs 
are actually given jobs, real jobs, and know some 
of the basics like how to conduct quarters the 
day they get there, I think the ship, you know 
their Department Head and Chiefs, and really the 
other DIVOs too, can prepare them, or help them 
do the rest. 
Another opinion supporting training of basic Division 
Officer knowledge and skills was taken during an interview 
with another prospective executive officer:
I think that should be a good goal of that course 
(NL401).  To make sure that when they get out 
there and stand up there at quarters on their 
first day, that they are ready to take over the 
division.
Finally, a Prospective CO made the following comment:
The seamanship, combat information center, all 
that crap, you learn it just by osmosis. 
Especially if you can and are doing your job as a 
DIVO. That stuff is easy to learn and pick up on 
just in day-to-day interactions with other people 
and Divisions on the ship.
Here it is important to again mention that all PCOs 
and PXOs, and one former CO were assigned to SWOSCOLCOM in 
Newport, RI.  Part of their courses of instruction while at 
SWOSCOLCOM covers the proper implementation of the Division 
Officer at Sea Program, which explicitly states that 
immediately upon arrival, Junior Officers will be assigned 
jobs as Division Officers.  Thus, data regarding the 
expectations of JOs, may be focused on this area.  
Additionally, this policy has been a source of contention 
in the Fleet.  Initially upon the implementation of DOSP, 
there was no clear direction of how to employ Ensigns.  
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This, coupled with the scarcity of DIVO jobs created by the 
surge of JOs caused by the disestablishment of the five-
month course, led each command to implement their own 
programs.  Many Ensigns were first assigned collateral 
duties or placed in an ad hoc shipboard training pipeline 
prior to assuming traditional duties and responsibilities 
as Division Officers. Data indicate that this is no longer 
the case.  All respondents, including the six Ensigns, 
indicated that recently commissioned SWOs were expected to 
be Division Officers within weeks of their arrival.  
Conversely, it is important to mention that most NL401 
instructors and prospective Department Heads indicated that 
they have had no formal training on the proper 
implementation of DOSP.  Most of the members of these 
groups were serving in operational assignments during the 
infancy of the program.  This may account for their 
concentration of commentary on watchstanding training 
needs.
Data gathered from the Ensign respondent group 
provides further support for the assumption that Ensigns 
will be employed as Division Officers soon after they 
report to their first ship:
I got to my ship and had to start working with my 
Division I think after about a week…we were on 
deployment. I took over for a guy who was moving 
to another division and he helped me out a lot.  
I mean I felt like I didn’t know what I was doing 
really… 
INT: What do you mean?  What do you wish you 
knew?
I wish I knew more about how my division tied 
into other areas of the ship.  Just basic stuff.  
I am the electrical officer, and my stuff is 
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really important, especially on deployment…I 
didn’t understand how fast things needed to get 
done…
Another Ensign said:
I showed up and my XO said you are the new 1st
Lieutenant.  I was surprised because that is not 
what my orders said, but I was excited about it.  
He told me who my Department Head was and I found 
him and he helped me get started.  He gave me a 
list of stuff that I needed to do and told me 
that he would introduce me at O-Call (Officer’s 
call) the next day.  Then I had to do quarters 
and just introduce myself there.  My chief is 
pretty good so he helped me.  You know we went 
over what I needed to say.  
When asked by the interviewer if that was awkward and 
did the Ensign feel like he should know what to say or 
do, or if he already knew it, he said:
Yeah, I had an idea, but you know, turning over 
so fast…It wasn’t embarrassing or anything.  I 
was prepared.  I think my first day went pretty 
good.  
Thus, the data indicate that Ensigns are expected to 
be trained to assume the duties and responsibilities of a 
Division Officer immediately after they arrive. Common 
knowledge and skill functions of a Division Officer that 
were repeatedly mentioned during focus groups and 
interviews are general shipboard organization and 
practices, maintenance and material management, and 
personnel system knowledge and management.
a. General Shipboard Organization and Practices  
The following are comments made by PCOs, Ensigns, 
and PXOs regarding expectations for knowing general 
shipboard organization and practices.  One former CO said:
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I think that they definitely need to understand 
how a ship is set up…what each one of the 
departments is responsible for, and just some 
general practices on the ship…some things that we 
all probably take for granted that everybody sort 
of understands that.  But they don’t understand 
that when they get to the ship.
An Ensign said:
You need to understand how a division on a ship 
runs…it is not like a squad at the Academy…I 
think Ensigns need more familiarity with what you 
are going to see on a surface ship.
The following statement was made by a female O-4 PXO, and 
summarizes these expectations and needs:
I think my basic thoughts are they should 
understand how a ship, a general ship is set up, 
departments, how it all works, what is the 
function of a DAPA (Drug and Alcohol Abuse 
Program Administrator), what is the function of a 
CMC (Command Master Chief), who are these people 
that are going to touch your lives as a Division 
Officer and what do they do.
All former COs, PCOs, and PXOs believed that having an 
understanding of general shipboard organization and 
practices is a key training need.  However, data suggest 
that this need may not be sufficiently addressed at their 
commissioning source.  The following paragraphs will 
address this apparent gap.
Data gathered from SWO leadership and Ensigns 
indicate that some Ensigns may be reporting to their ships 
without being trained in, and having an understanding of 
general shipboard organization, and how different divisions 
and departments work together as a team to achieve the 
mission. A PXO said: 
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They need to know, OK, these are the Departments 
on the ship, so if I am the auxiliaries officer, 
I know what my functions are, and this is the 
Supply Officer, and I might have to deal with him 
or her…I don’t see Ensigns really comprehending 
that stuff…For some reason I feel like they want 
to keep everything inside their own little box, 
and that is frustrating and led to problems on my 
last ship…You know, they need to know that it is 
OK, that they have to communicate with other 
officers onboard.
One Ensign, who did his summer cruise aboard a salvage 
ship, said:
My personal experience was…I hadn’t set foot on a 
real ship until I got to my first command…I think 
there should be a baseline for OK, this is what 
you are going to be expected to do…a very basic 
outline of what a Division Officer really does.
One prospective Executive Officer mentioned that her 
Division Officers had never seen the ship’s SORM (Standard 
Organization and Regulations Manual).  Contained in the 
SORM is a detailed description of the function, and duties 
and responsibilities of each member of the command.  She 
said:  
The Ensigns that worked for me, really had no 
guidance before they got to the ship…I don’t know 
if it was their fault, but if they had at least 
seen the SORM, and what they were expected to do, 
it would have helped them conceptualize what 
their first few days onboard would have been 
like…and maybe they wouldn’t have seemed so lost.
The apparent lack of training or deficiency in training 
Midshipmen on what is expected of them as Division Officers 
as soon as they report to their first ship is a serious 
gap.  Some Ensigns reported not even knowing who their 
Department Head (DH) or their immediate superior was, and 
what role their DH played in their daily routines.  
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Paraphrasing one Ensign, running a division is not like 
running a squad at the Naval Academy.  Providing training 
on what their basic function, duties, and responsibilities 
will be is one portion of preparing them for success as 
Division Officers.  The other, involves educating them in 
the affective and cognitive domains of the jobs they will 
shortly be performing.  These domains will be explored in 
the next portion of this chapter.  
b. Maintenance and Material Management  
The second sub-theme regarding Division Officer 
training needs that emerged was the maintenance and 
material management system (3M).  This system is composed 
of the preventive maintenance system (PMS), and maintenance 
data system.  The 3M system provides an efficient, uniform 
method for scheduling, performing, and recording preventive 
and corrective maintenance. Management of this system is 
considered a function of the Division Officer and work-
center supervisor, normally a senior Petty Officer.  One 
prospective Commanding Officer said:
I guess Division Officers need to know just basic 
stuff, basic jargon so that they know what is 
going on…We went to a brief today, about how 
ships are failing in 3M, and we expect our 
division officers to be more involved, but it 
takes them at least six months to get involved 
when they do the self-training modules…we are at 
a disadvantage if they don’t know that stuff…I 
guess I don’t expect them to really know it when 
they first get there, but at least have an idea 
of how important it is…I want them to own it, or 
be able to own it (the 3M program), to be able to 
assert themselves and recognize and fix problems.
In addition to each PCO making similar comments on this 
subject, all six PXOs reported that when they were 
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Department Heads they wished their DIVOs were more involved 
with the 3M system.  One said:
I am concerned that 3M is a dying art in the 
Navy.  And I am not sure why.  I am being 
dramatic, but I don’t think any of my DIVOs 
really understood PMS boards or writing jobs…I 
could never really put my finger on it, just a 
gut feeling like we, as a Wardroom, were missing 
something with 3M, like something was different 
from when I was a DIVO. I felt like the Chiefs 
and me were doing most of the work there…The LDOs 
and Warrants were the only DIVOs who were 
experts.
Additionally, When asked “what is the one thing you wished 
you knew the day you arrived on your ship,” four out of the 
six Ensigns responded “3M.”  A few Ensign comments were:
(1) I wish I was a little bit more aware, 
especially on 3M.  I could write evals, that was 
fairly easy, I could understand technical talk 
about the Electronic Warfare gear, but dealing 
with some of the 3M and knowing this is what I 
need to look at for my weekly boards and my 
quarterly boards would have helped.
(2) Other things were like how to get maintenance 
done and fix things.  I mean CHENG (Chief 
Engineer) would tell me to fix something or order 
a part and I felt like I was always asking my 
Chief.  I wanted to be able to do that stuff by 
myself, you know not do it, but make sure it was 
done right.
Again it is important to mention that data 
collected from PCOs and PXOs may be skewed by their 
assignment to SWOSCOLCOM.  The Navy’s 3M system has 
undergone fundamental changes within the last four years.  
Because of increased readiness requirements outlined in the 
Fleet Response Plan, the Surface Ship Maintenance 
(SHIPMAIN) program was developed to streamline the 
maintenance process.  Navy leadership sought to maximize 
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the utility of its surface assets by maintaining the 
effectiveness of its maintenance processes, while 
increasing their efficiency. Greater responsibilities have 
been placed on the ships to do the right maintenance, at
the right place, at the right time.  As a result of these 
changes, more emphasis has been placed on maintenance 
training at all levels of SWO leadership, including SWOS 
PCO and PXO schools.  Data indicate that maintenance was on 
the minds of PCOs and PXOs that were interviewed.  
Additionally, the Fleet has requested SWOS to allocate more 
time for maintenance training at the three-week Division 
Officer Course.  However, data indicate there is limited 
exposure to the 3M program at the commissioning sources. 
It is this researcher’s opinion that front-loading this 
type of training is feasible and will offer significant 
training value.
Administering this program and ensuring its 
success is a duty and responsibility of each Division 
Officer. Ensuring proper maintenance of their equipment is 
arguably their primary Division Officer duty.  Data from 
all respondent groups indicate that Division Officers are 
failing in this area on a Fleet-wide scale.  Additionally, 
data indicate that a gap exists between this training need 
and the curricula at the commissioning sources.  All 
Ensigns, USNA graduates, stated that the level of 3M 
training they received did not prepare them for performing 
this management function in the Fleet.  One said:
We got 3M training, but it was basically, there 
will be 3M on your ship, and you will be an 
administrator. I think that is about it.  
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Thus, it appears that Ensigns are reporting to ships, being 
held accountable for their division’s 3M program, and have 
not been properly trained.
c. Personnel System Knowledge and Management
The third recurrent Division Officer training 
expectation involved managing personnel.  All Fleet 
respondents, including the NL401 instructors and Ensigns, 
cited personnel management as an expectation and need, but 
were seldom specific in their comments.  The common 
functions Division Officers are expected to perform in this 
area are outlined in the Professional Core Competencies 
Manual for Officer Accession Programs, which was published 
by the Chief of Naval Personnel in 2001.  However, four 
common sub-themes were identified in this research.  They 
are, in order of precedence:
 Personnel Qualification System (PQS) and Training
 Enlisted Service Records
 Enlisted Distribution Verification Report (EDVR)
Data indicate that Ensigns are expected to report to their 
first ship having a basic understanding of at least each of 
these programs and documents. One PCO said:
Understanding how admin works, understanding how 
PQS works and really how to manage a good PQS and 
training program so that your people stay on 
track, you know watch-team replacement plans, and 
understanding what a personnel service record is, 
a lot of those things that you can really 
actually understand before you get there.  I 
think those things are important.
A former CO said:
One other thing that I think we could have done 
better at the DIVO level was PQS and quals.  
There are so many personnel qualification 
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requirements associated with force protection and 
various other things…My DIVOs either didn’t 
understand how to manage a good training program, 
or weren’t organized enough to do it right…DIVOs 
on my ship were not training their people, or 
making sure they were trained right.  I felt like 
every qualification that I signed was a reaction 
to something…My DIVOs didn’t understand that they 
needed to be proactive with their programs.
A prospective Department Head, who recently completed two 
Division Officer tours provided the following comment:
When I was a DIVO I had all sorts of personnel 
problems initially.  I was First Lieutenant and 
was put in charge of thirty or so sailors, and we 
were getting ready to deploy…I was a little 
overwhelmed…I guess when I get back out to the 
Fleet I really want my DIVOs to understand how 
the personnel system works, you know if I lose a 
sailor, how do I get a replacement, or can I, and 
just how to recognize manning issues, EDVR stuff.  
Those issues can really make it hard on a ship, 
especially if you aren’t tracking them at the 
DIVO level…I don’t think I was prepared to deal 
with some of those issues.
Additionally, when asked to write down the top five KSAAs 
they believe Ensigns should have when they report to their 
first ship, nine out of sixteen NL401 instructors mentioned 
one or more of these personnel management related themes. 
Eight out of sixteen said that NL401 was at best marginally 
effective at teaching these training requirements.  
d. Soft-Skill Division Officer Training Needs  
Lastly, what may be considered soft skill 
Division Officer knowledge and skill expectations emerged 
during the interviews and focus groups.  These themes were 
more difficult to extract but were still widespread 
throughout respondent groups.  The knowledge and skills 
mentioned most were understanding daily ship’s routine and 
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effective time management, professional writing, and public 
speaking. The following are comments made regarding the 
need for understanding the daily routine and the need for 
Division Officers to manage their time accordingly.  One 
former CO remarked:
They really need to know, OK this is your 
Department Head, your boss, you should talk to 
him more than once every day.  In the morning he 
will go to a meeting with the XO and the other 
Department Heads, the Captain will not be there, 
then he will hold a meeting with you and all your 
fellow division officers, then your chief will be 
waiting for you at quarters…and you may have a 
meeting, or a (PMS) spot-check.  I’m being 
simplistic, but not really…and this stuff can 
easily be taught.
Another former CO stationed at USNA said:
Just sitting people down and saying here is how 
to use a day timer, or here is how to use a palm 
pilot or here are a myriad of different ways you 
can be organized…pick one try it out, if it 
doesn’t work, try another one. Personal time 
management is important. 
Personal time management, and understanding of a Division 
Officer’s daily routine, appear to be key expectations and 
training needs for Junior Surface Warfare Officers.  
Additionally, data indicate that a gap may exist between 
this training need and the training curricula at USNA.  
Data indicate that there are general training 
shortcomings with regards to what the daily routine of a 
Division Officer should be.  SWO leadership respondents 
reported that most of their Ensigns struggled with planning 
their day, and making and meeting appointments and 
deadlines.  According to one PCO:
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I was always amazed at how some Ensigns just 
failed to make it to stuff, and I mean events, 
briefs, and meetings with the CO, watch, 
everything.  And this goes back to me being a 
Senior Watch Officer too.  You always get a few 
who just don’t seem to understand that sometimes 
their presence is required…They just weren’t good 
at managing their time and prioritizing…and that 
is really important.  Half of being a good Ensign 
is perfect attendance!  I am serious, if you just 
show up and are seen, then there is an automatic 
assumption that you know what is going on.  
One PXO, a USNA grad, said:
When I was a Department Head and Senior Watch 
Officer, I had a hard time getting my Academy JOs 
to be (where they needed to be) on time.  I had a 
few that didn’t work for me…that just could not 
make it to watch.  I had to constantly make sure 
that they read the watchbills…and understood what 
time they had watch…It seemed to me that the ROTC 
guys were better at (making it to watch on 
time)…I felt like they didn’t quite understand 
that it was a problem, or why I was always on 
their back…It was embarrassing.
Being trained and held accountable to planning out their 
day, so that know where they need to be is a key training 
shortcoming.  Data indicate that Division Officers are 
losing credibility with their sailors, their peers, and 
their superiors because they display trends of being absent 
or late; they don’t know how to plan and organize.
Professional writing was another soft skill theme 
that emerged.  This area includes writing enlisted 
personnel evaluations (evals), fitness reports (fitreps) 
for Chief Petty Officers and Officers, and writing awards.  
Ensigns especially saw this area as an important training 
expectation and need, and five out of six made comments 
that indicate that they were not prepared.  When asked what 
he wished he was taught, one Ensign said:
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Eval and fitrep writing. We do it as MIDs within 
our squads but that is nowhere near how you write 
an eval or fitrep in the Fleet.  A lot of Ensigns 
get out here, just like me, and learn the hard 
way.  We think we went to college and we think 
yeah we can do this, but…that is something that 
we don’t learn and I spent a lot of my time, a 
whole lot of my time, working on that stuff.
The next soft skill training expectation and need is public 
speaking ability.  When asked about experiences that 
embarrassed them or made them feel uncomfortable, all 
Ensigns responded with their own public speaking story.  
Four of them were in Division Officer roles that required 
them to prepare briefs for particular events, and others 
were involved with command-level training situations that 
required them to address the wardroom or other members of 
the crew. Most did not understand that they were expected 
to do more than just “speak from a power-point brief;” 
their comments indicated that they were not prepared.  One 
PCO said:
I want my DIVOs to be really engaged in training, 
at all levels.  And, one of the things that I 
expect is that they are able to speak to groups, 
whether it be the wardroom or a duty section or 
whatever…I want them to understand how to engage 
sailors and get them excited about training. 
e. Positive Attributes of USNA Graduates 
Throughout the data, several positive attributes 
of USNA graduates with respect to Division Officer training 
emerged. Although some data were contradictory, it appears 
that USNA grads are better prepared than their peers in the 
areas of professional writing and public speaking. 
Anxieties over professional writing and public speaking 
emerged only in the Division Officer respondent group.  In 
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fact, both former COs, and four of the PCOs and PXOs touted 
USNA graduates as being better than their peers in these 
areas.  One former CO said:
 All of my Academy grads…were good writers, at 
least I thought they were, but that is one of 
those things that is really hard to define…I 
guess they were good at understanding what I 
wanted from them…As CO and when I was XO, I 
didn’t have to keep sending admin paperwork back 
to them like I did with some of my other DIVOs.  
I only had to tell them once, and I would get 
what I wanted.
A PCO who was an NROTC graduate said:
I was always impressed with the way my USNA JOs 
spoke in front of sailors…As XO I tried to put 
all my DIVOs in situations where they would have 
to address the crew, just to give them the 
opportunity to feel in charge, the face time, and 
so the crew would see them as being in 
charge…They gave great briefs, and had a lot of 
confidence that I didn’t see in some of my other 
Ensigns…I think the Naval Academy prepared them 
well for that.
A former CO said:
I never really cared how good my JOs were at 
writing. The only person that I needed to be a 
good writer was my XO and I think that no matter 
how bad a writer you are as a DIVO, by the time 
you are an XO you should be good at it…
Thus, the data suggest that perhaps anxieties and perceived 
shortcomings in this Division Officer training area are not 
attributable to training at USNA.  It seems that in 
general, USNA is preparing its graduates to succeed in 
these management areas.  
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f. Summary of Division Officer Training Needs
In summary, the data show that Fleet training 
expectations for Division Officer knowledge and skills are 
fairly narrow and consistent.  Ensigns are expected to be 
Division Officers the day they arrive, and are expected to 
perform and demonstrate proficiency in several management 
functions. Knowing how to conduct morning quarters on their 
first day was frequently mentioned as a key baseline 
expectation and need.  Second, all respondent groups 
indicated that a basic understanding of shipboard and 
divisional organization was essential and lacking.  Next, 
what may be considered Division Officer hard skills were 
most often identified as expectations and needs.  The most 
prevalent training needs and training gaps in this area 
were 3M and personnel system knowledge and management.  The 
soft Division Officer knowledge and skills that were most 
frequently cited were time management, professional 
writing, and public speaking. Understanding the daily 
routine of a ship, and managing time accordingly appears to 
be a significant training gap. The following paragraphs 
present data relating to expectations for watchstanding 
knowledge and skills. 
2. Watchstanding Training Needs      
Data indicate that expectations for watchstanding 
knowledge and skills are secondary to expectations of 
Division Officer knowledge and skills. All Fleet respondent 
groups indicated that watchstanding knowledge and skills 
were important training needs and expectations. However, 
the NL401 instructors and prospective Department Heads 
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cited them more frequently and passionately, while the 
former COs, PCOs, and PXOs mentioned them least. One O-3 
instructor said:
Another way to look at it is, you know, an 
Ensign’s first impression that they are going to 
make is going to be on the bridge standing watch, 
and that’s the real opportunity to show what the 
guys really know. 
Prospective Department Heads said:
(1) I think they should know, you know what I 
envision them learning on Midshipman cruise.  
They should understand the bridge watch rotation, 
and how that works, and they should have the 
basics down.  Like, they should know how to do a 
moboard, a basic stationing or CPA problem…and 
then the basics of navigation, like the rules of 
dead reckoning, and how to read a chart…They 
should be money on standard commands. 
(2) When I showed up, I was king of the Ensigns 
because I knew the importance of the CO’s 
Standing Orders and that I should tour the spaces 
before taking the watch and stuff like that…other 
people just didn’t know that…and the Captain saw 
me as being a bright guy, and that made my life 
much easier.
An Ensign remarked:
At least initially, showing up to a surface ship, 
he has to be a good ship driver.  From what I 
have seen, since being on the ship and seeing 
some of the new Ensigns, it seems like ship 
driving is one area that they don’t do too good 
in.
The former COs, PCOs and PXOs had distinctly different 
opinions than the O-3 respondents regarding Junior Officer 
watchstanding training expectations.  The general 
sentiments of these respondent groups were that it is the 
ship’s responsibility to train Junior Officers in bridge 
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watchstanding skills and procedures, and expectations for 
their knowledge and skill levels in this area are 
relatively low.  Therefore very little discussion was 
dedicated to these types of needs.  One former CO remarked:
…every CO, it is their job to teach their people 
how to drive the ship.  So, if they know standard 
commands and they are not scared to go up there 
and take the conn, that’s fine.  My job is to 
develop them in the seamanship side of the house. 
A PCO said:
The seamanship, combat information center, all 
that crap, you learn it just by osmosis. 
Especially if you can and are doing your job as a 
DIVO. That stuff is easy to learn and pick up on 
just in day to day interactions with other people 
and Divisions on the ship.
The four most frequently mentioned watchstanding 




 Navigation and Shiphandling Principles
 Rules of the Road 
Due to the infrequency of discussion on watchstanding 
training needs in the former CO, PCO, and PXO respondent 
groups, this list was compiled primarily from data 
collected from the NL401 focus group and Prospective 
Department Heads.  However, the following paragraphs 
present data that relate to bridge watchstanding knowledge 
and skill training expectations and needs that was 
collected from all respondent groups.
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a. Maneuvering Boards
The ability to perform maneuvering board 
(moboard) calculations has long been a staple Junior 
Officer bridge watchstanding skill. In addition to training 
at their commissioning source, considerable time was spent 
at the five-month SWOS training JOs on moboards.  
Maneuvering boards provide watchstanders who are 
responsible for the safe navigation of the ship, a visual 
representation of relative motion.  From a correctly 
performed moboard, closest point of approach (CPA) data can 
be obtained; along with courses, speeds, and times to 
station; true wind and desired wind; and contact avoidance 
data.  Understanding moboards, and being proficient at 
doing them is essential for all Officer of the Deck 
qualified SWOs.  Thus it is no surprise that those SWOs who 
have recently stood watch on the bridge, namely NL401 
instructors and Prospective Department Heads, are 
passionate about moboard training.  Data from these groups 
indicate that moboard training is a need, and a gap exists 
between the need and training.  One NL401 instructor said:
Think of the most important things, moboards, 
Rules of the Road, all those things that make you 
an impact player as soon as you check onboard…the 
things that were hammered to us [at SWOS] are the 
things that are missing most, because I have 
stood watch with people who haven’t been to SWOS 
…You get underway for a group sail, and you are 
the OOD, and you have a JOOD that doesn’t know 
how…to do a moboard and it (is not a good 
situation).
One Prospective Department Head said:
You would expect, coming from the Naval 
Academy,that a guy should be able to do 
moboards…and amazingly we don’t see that.
94
b. Standard Commands
Knowledge of standard commands was another 
frequently mentioned watchstanding training need. Standard 
commands are the orders given by the conning officer, the 
Junior Officer who is driving the ship, to the helm 
(rudder) and lee helm (engines).  They are outlined in a 
standard format to eliminate confusion between members of 
the bridge watchteam, and it is imperative that they be 
given as such.  Unlike moboards, standard commands were 
frequently mentioned as a training need by the more senior 
SWO leadership respondents, but not necessarily a 
deficiency.  All former COs and PCOs, and five of the six 
PXOs mentioned this as a need at least once during the 
interviews. A former CO said:
The only watch, or shipdriving related thing I 
would like them to know before they get onboard, 
but I don’t even really think of it as a 
requirement, is standard commands…All of my JOs 
from the Naval Academy knew standard 
commands…They can easily be taught at the 
commissioning source or onboard.
A PXO remarked:
The first time an Ensign drives a ship, or is the 
conning officer, should not be when they get to 
my ship. So I think it is reasonable to expect 
them to know standard commands, and for their 
sake, they need to know them well enough to be 
comfortable up on the bridge.  That is where I 
think you draw the line between the commissioning 
source’s training responsibility and mine, or 
ours as a ship.
All Prospective Department Heads frequently mentioned 
standard commands as a training expectation and two 
mentioned it as a need.  One said:
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I was a rockstar on day one, just because I knew 
moboards and standard commands.  Just knowing 
those things set me apart from the JOs that got 
there around the same time that I did.
Lastly, thirteen out of sixteen NL401 instructors believed 
standard commands were one of the five most important 
skills a Junior Officer should have prior to reporting to 
their first ship.  One instructor, a Lieutenant Commander 
said:
Well what was surprising was…I took a poll in my 
class and said, how many people have not conned a 
ship or vessel in the last year and I got 2/3 
that raised their hand. The other 1/3 did YPs…  
So I said if I were to give you a pop quiz on 
standard commands you would probably fail.  [The 
student responded], ‘yes sir. I would probably 
fail. I’m very rusty.’ I thought wow, it has been 
less than a year and they have forgotten.
Therefore, data seem to indicate that knowledge of standard 
commands is both an expectation and a need.
c. Navigation and Shiphandling Principles
The third most frequently mentioned bridge 
watchstanding training expectation was knowledge of 
navigation and shiphandling principles.  This sub-theme 
encompasses the knowledge and skill sets that are taught in 
NN204 (Navigation and Piloting), and during YP and sailing 
training.  Although this sub-theme is extremely broad, 
individual training needs that fall within the theme were 
frequently mentioned throughout the data.  Due to time 
considerations and the breadth of questions, most of these 
needs were listed by the respondents as being part of the 
watchstanding skill set.  Again, these needs were most 
frequently addressed by NL401 instructors and prospective 
Department Heads. Table 9 depicts individual needs and the 
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frequency that they were mentioned within each respondent 
group, and illustrates the predominantly watchstanding need 
orientation of the NL401 instructor respondent group.   
Respondent Groups (# of participants)











Plotting 12 1 1 1 4 2 21
Lights/dayshapes 5 0 0 0 1 0 6
OOD Math 3 0 0 0 1 0 4
RT Procedures 11 1 1 2 3 2 20
Linehandling 7 1 1 0 3 0 12
Ship control 
forces
11 1 1 2 1 2 18
Shiphandling 
Characteristics
11 1 2 2 2 2 20
Table 9.  Navigation and Shiphandling Training Needs
The sub-themes that were mentioned in all 
respondent groups at least once, were plotting, Radio 
Telephone (RT) Procedures, shiphandling characteristics 
such as those found in a ship’s tactical data folder, and 
ship control forces (wind, current, tugs, etc.). Thus, data 
indicate that these are perhaps the most important 
watchstanding training needs for JOs. The most frequently 
mentioned need was navigation plotting.  This need was also 
the only navigation and shiphandling theme that was 
discussed in any detail.  Most respondents who cited this 
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need, including one former CO, a PCO, and a PXO, expressed 
the need for only a basic understanding of plotting 
procedures.  One PXO said:
They need to know the basics of navigation…How to 
look at a GPS and plot their position on a chart.  
As far as navigation goes, that is about all I 
expect, and really all they need because the rest 
they will learn as they stand watch and get some 
underway time.
Additionally, most respondent data support the hypothesis 
that Midshipmen are expected be proficient in these skills 
after participating in the maritime continuum; their Naval 
Science courses, and mandatory training programs such as YP 
cruise, gray hull cruise, and Command, Seamanship, and 
Navigation Training Squadron (CSNTS) cruise.  Only one PXO, 
a USNA graduate, said that he has seen a gap between these 
expectations and what he has experienced in the fleet.  He 
said:
Just make sure they know the fundamentals. Make 
sure they know navigation and plotting.  When we 
took our navigation test (at SWOS) we had a sixty 
percent failure rate.  And our class was ninety-
five percent Academy grads…based on that and 
based on what I saw as a Department Head and 
DIVO.  And I know as a senior you are supposed to 
be tested on it, but based on what I have seen I 
think it is an abysmal failure.
d. Rules of the Road
The last watchstanding training need identified 
in the research was Rules of the Road.  Rules of the Road, 
or Navigation Rules, are promulgated by the United States 
Coast Guard, and provide a legal foundation for safe 
navigation of vessels in inland and international waters.  
Understanding and obeying these rules are unconditional 
pre-requisites for obtaining the Officer of the Deck 
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qualification.  Understanding Rules of the Road provides 
the groundwork upon which all other maritime skills must be 
built.  In fact, while at SWOS, all PXOs and PCOs must take 
a written Rules of the Road test and score 100 percent 
prior to being assigned to their next command. Therefore, 
it is no surprise that when discussing watchstanding 
training needs, all respondents cited Rules of the Road.  
However, very little discussion was dedicated to this area, 
possibly because it is seen as such a fundamental need, and 
thus it is unreasonable to hypothesize about the existence 
of a training gap.  One former CO said:
I think there should be tests that cover things 
like standard commands…and Rules of the Road…You 
can’t give enough Rules of the Road tests.  It is 
just one of those things that you have to know.    
e. Positive Attributes of USNA Graduates
Throughout the data, positive attribues of USNA 
graduates with respect to watchstanding training were 
identified.  Data from the former COs and three PCOs 
indicate that in general, USNA graduates are good bridge 
watchstanders.  One former CO stationed at USNA said:
I mean all of them were good ship drivers…all of 
the JOs from the Naval Academy had a good sense 
of relative motion and they picked up on things 
on the bridge easily.  I think they get a lot of 
that stuff here.
A PCO said:
Throughout my career, even as a DIVO, I have 
always thought that Academy guys were better ship
drivers.  I guess they are exposed to it earlier 
with the YPs…I have always admired their skills 
on the bridge.
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The same PCO went on to say that during a deployment while 
he was XO, his Captain trusted only three OODs to stand 
watch, and all of them were Academy graduates. 
f. Summary of Watchstanding Training Needs
In summary, Division Officer skill and knowledge 
requirements appear to be the primary training expectations 
and needs for Division Officers in the Fleet.  Second to 
these training needs are watchstanding hard skills.  The 
skills most frequently mentioned were, in order of 
precedence, moboards, standard commands, navigation and 
shiphandling principles, and rules of the road, all of 
which are covered throughout the maritime continuum.  In 
other words, there appears to be a need to review this 
material during 1st Class year, and NL401 is the appropriate 
venue for doing so.  The following paragraphs will outline 
data pertaining to educational needs of SWO Junior 
Officers.
D. STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF EDUCATIONAL NEEDS
For the purposes of this research, the term 
educational needs  is used to mean those knowledge, skill, 
ability and attitude requirements that must be taught in 
NL401 in order to further promote the moral and mental 
development of Midshipmen as they transition to becoming  
SWOs and leaders of a division of sailors.  Unlike training 
needs, educational needs seek to initiate sets of learning 
processes that will allow Midshipmen to apply their own 
interpretations and energies to assessing and acting in 
situations they will encounter as Officers in the Fleet.  
Often these needs are associated with leadership functions 
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and performance, instead of management functions and 
performance, and are not easily evaluated using 
quantitative criteria.
This portion of research is dedicated to exploring 
stakeholder perceptions of the educational needs of 
Midshipmen enrolled in NL401.  The following paragraphs 
will present and discuss data collected from all respondent 
groups including the ODEV/PRODEV DMPs and PMPs. This 
section will be organized according to the types of 
educational needs that emerged from the focus groups and 
interviews. Data will be presented to illustrate optimal 
and actual SWO JO performance in the Fleet as it relates to 
the affective and cognitive domains of learner behavior.  
Also during this portion of the research, potential 
education gaps will be identified and discussed.  This 
portion will be concluded with a discussion regarding 
positive attributes of USNA graduates that relate to these 
educational needs. 
According to Popham’s model for conducting educational 
needs assessments that was described in Chapter  III, 
researchers must be attentive to all three domains of 
learner behavior.  These domains are the affective, 
cognitive, and the psychomotor.  Psychomotor needs are most 
often associated with the performance of a repetitive 
physical task such as in manufacturing or production. 
Because of the nature of their duties and responsibilities, 
educational needs for Division Officers in the Surface Navy 
rarely involve the psychomotor domain. Therefore, only the 
affective and cognitive domains will be explored in this 
research.
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1. Affective Needs of SWO JOs
Division Officers are the lowest ranking SWOs in the 
chain of command aboard surface ships.  As such, while 
leading their division and in the execution of their 
watchstanding duties, they serve closer to the enlisted 
sailors than higher-echelon officers.  They closely 
interact with sailors on personal and professional levels 
on a daily basis, and have the ability to exert more direct 
influence over sailors than any other SWO leadership group. 
To successfully satisfy the leadership requirements and 
responsibilities inherent in their office, SWO Division 
Officers must possess certain affective qualities. The 
following paragraphs present and discuss themes relating to 
the affective needs of SWO JOs that emerged during this 
research.
As described by Popham, affective needs are those 
attitudinal, valuing, and emotional needs that individuals 
must possess in order to effectively perform their job. The 
affective domain refers to the manner in which individuals 
emotionally process events and interactions.  Included in 
this domain are values, feelings, appreciations, 
enthusiasms, motivations, and attitudes (Krathwohl, D. R., 
Bloom, B. S., & Bertram, B. M., 1973).  During this 
research, data pertaining to the affective needs of SWO JOs 
were gathered from internal and external NL401 
stakeholders, and several themes were identified.  They 
are:
 Foundational Values: Integrity, Honor, Moral 
Courage
 Officership Values: Knowing Their People, 
Engaging Their People, Setting the Example
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 Realizing, Understanding, and Using Their Power: 
Intrusive Leadership and Assertiveness 
 Confidence 
 Enthusiasm, Motivation, and Initiative
It is important to mention here that a general theme 
throughout the data was that these educational needs are 
what will have the most significant impact on the 
perceptions of a Junior Officer. The educational themes, as 
opposed to training themes, were much more difficult to 
extract from respondents who are very close to the 
operational Fleet.  However, once probed, the examples of 
deficiencies that were cited were much more poignant than 
those cited during discussions of training needs.  It is 
also important to note, as Colonel Art Athens, 
Distinguished Military Professor of Leadership, stated 
during the DMP/PMP focus group: 
When Junior Officers fail, when they are fired, 
and bring discredit upon themselves, the Navy or 
Marine Corps, and the Naval Academy it is for 
character related issues, not performance…
In other words, there is a presumption that as a Naval 
Officer you are a man or woman of character.  Data support 
that good character will not necessarily guarantee success, 
but character flaws will guarantee failure.  The incidents 
where JOs demonstrate character failures are ones that 
stick in the minds of those work with them.  
a. Foundational Values
The first theme that emerged was a need for SWO 
JOs to have what one PCO described as foundational needs, 
which for the purposes of this research will be referred to 
as foundational values.  These needs can best be described 
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and packaged as those internal characteristics that the 
general public would attribute to the character of Naval 
Officers. Interview questions that most frequently garnered 
responses associated with this theme were:
1. Have you noticed any common, poignant deficiencies 
in JOs that could be addressed by their 
commissioning source? This question was often 
probed with a specific question about character 
deficiencies.
2. How do you think USNA can best prepare a future 
Surface Warfare Officer?
3. Based on your experience do you believe JOs today 
fully understand the responsibilities of 
officership?
Not surprisingly, common examples given by interview and 
focus group respondents were integrity, moral courage, 
honor, and professionalism. The same PCO mentioned above 
said:     
Anyone who shows up to your ship will have 
deficiencies.  And whatever you emphasize during 
the short time we train them, you know if you 
emphasize one thing then something else will be 
dropped off.  So, I don’t think we can be too 
optimistic about any of those [training] 
things…So I am more concerned about the 
foundation of the person.  What matters to me is 
integrity, moral courage, and respect for his 
office and his sailors…that is my take on it. 
At some point during all interviews with PCOs, 
former COs, and PXOs, mention was made of the need for JOs 
to possess and internalize the Navy’s core values, and nine 
out of fourteen stated that they believe it is a need that 
must be addressed.  Most members of these respondent groups 
stated that they have served with more than one Junior 
Officer who violated the Navy’s Core Values. In most 
instances, incidents cited by respondents were not lapses 
of judgment but lack of character. In a discussion of her 
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leadership case studies program that she implemented on her 
ship, one former CO remarked:
We just had all ensigns do the case studies 
together and then make a presentation to all the 
Department Heads and all the Departmental Chiefs, 
and they walked them through the case study and 
what they would do, and how did honor courage and 
commitment fit in, and then it was pretty eye 
opening that even some of those that had been 
there for quite some time were still a little bit 
clueless even after a year and a half onboard.  
A Prospective XO said:
…one of my JOs, my First Lieutenant, lied to me 
about ordering his Chief to operate a piece of 
gear that we knew shouldn’t be moved. It is a 
long story, but it was the only time I lost my 
cool I think…That stuck with me and left a bad 
taste in my mouth about all the JOs from the 
Naval Academy. It was the first time I had been 
lied to, or knew I was being lied to by a 
shipmate, a fellow officer, and maybe I was 
paranoid or something, but I just felt like they 
were all shady…Like they were trying to get away 
with stuff… 
Another PCO said:
The only real personnel problem I had in my 
wardroom involved a Naval Academy graduate who 
was arrested on base fraternizing with one of my 
enlisted sailors.  I’ve heard those stories, but 
still couldn’t believe it…She knew the rules and 
apparently had been talked to about her 
relationship with this sailor by some of my other 
Ensigns, which made me question more than just 
her character…I really believe they could have 
saved her career…
One PXO, an OCS graduate said:
On my ship, the Academy guys showed up and it was 
absolutely guys gone wild…I saw guys with their 
Chief and everybody else looking at them and 
thinking what is with that ass-hole, who can 
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barely stand up at quarters…I saw that more than 
often than I wanted to, and I counseled more than 
a few of them on my last ship.
Conversely, one PXO said:
I never had issues with kids lying or anything, 
it didn’t matter which commissioning source they 
were from…I never had that problem.
Therefore, data indicate that at least some Junior Officers 
in the Surface Navy are failing to demonstrate these 
foundational values.  This is a serious educational gap 
that needs to be addressed. NL401 is an excellent 
opportunity to revisit the Navy’s Core Values. 
b. Officership Values
The second recurring affective need theme that 
emerged throughout the data was a need for Division 
Officers to be educated in and possess what will be 
referred to as Officership Values.  These values can best 
be described as external, instead of internal, leadership 
characteristics that would commonly be attributed to 
Officers in the United States military.  These themes were 
more prevalent throughout the data than the foundational 
values, but commentary was not as alarming.  The three sub-
themes relating to Officership values that were most 
frequently mentioned in the data were setting the example 
and leading from the front; communication; outwardly 
demonstrating a deep feeling of responsibility for the 
sailors who worked for them, and willfully engaging them on 
a regular basis.
All respondent groups noted setting the example 
and leading from the front as primary Officership values.  
These values emerged in discussions with both former COs, 
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five of six PCOs, all PXOs, and five out of six prospective 
Department Heads.  Additionally, nine out of sixteen NL401 
instructors mentioned setting the example as one of the top 
five KSAAs Junior Officers need to possess. A former CO 
said: 
On day one, they need to understand that there is 
a presumption on the part of the Captain, the XO, 
the Chief, and most importantly the sailors, that 
that officer who just graduated from Annapolis 
knows how to be a Division Officer…Sailors expect 
to be led, and want to be led, and need to be led 
by their Division Officer…And if they set the 
right example, if they act like the professional 
officer that they are expected to be, I believe 
that they will be successful.  On the other hand 
if they don’t, then they will probably not do too 
well.  You can’t overcome that bad first 
impression. 
When asked what leadership traits he expects his Division 
Officers to possess, a PCO remarked:
If you give me an Ensign who is happy to be 
there, who is proud to be on my ship, and if they 
set a good example, are good role models, then I 
will be satisfied and believe that those 
individuals will be successful leaders…And I 
don’t care so much about perfect uniforms and 
shiny shoes. I have seen some Ensigns that think 
that that is what setting the example means, and 
Academy guys in my experience have always had 
superb military bearing…What I want them to 
understand is they need to act like someone their 
sailors want to be…They should be respected by 
their sailors, and understand that they don’t 
have to be their friends all the time, and I know 
that some of my JOs were not looked at by the 
crew in that way.
In addition to setting the example being identified as an 
education need, data also indicate that a gap exists 
between what is expected and what is seen. A PXO provided 
the following comment:
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Two Ensigns from the Naval Academy and two 
Ensigns from ROTC reported to my second ship on 
the same day.  And two of them, one Naval Academy 
and one ROTC, showed up and it was so bad, they 
looked so bad, that the Senior Chief had to take 
them aside and tell them they couldn’t come to 
quarters dressed like that ever again.  If you’re 
in the Engineering Department, and the Senior 
Chief is pulling you aside, then you have serious 
issues.  You know, don’t be a moron. I 
immediately thought these two were idiots…It was 
hard for me and them to get over that.
The second recurring Officership education theme 
that emerged was being able to communicate up and down the 
chain of command.  Most PCOs, PXOs, and prospective 
Department Heads mentioned communication as a need, and 
nine out of sixteen NL401 instructors believed it was an 
important aspect of a Junior Officer’s education.  Most 
respondent groups however, provided little discussion on 
this theme.  One PXO said:
I am big on communication. Being able to get the 
right information to the right people at the 
right time will be a big part of my job as XO, 
and I need my JOs to be onboard with what I 
expect. When I was a Department Head I always 
told my DIVOs that I wanted them to come to me 
with the problem, the impact, and their proposed 
solution. Not a 100 percent solution, it took a 
while for some of them to get that part…And it 
seemed like some of them never got it…They really 
need to understand that bad news gets worse with 
age.
An NL401 instructor, a Lieutenant Commander, said:
It used to drive me crazy when my DIVOs would 
bring their Chiefs, or not even bring their 
Chiefs, but send their Chiefs, to see me about 
problems…They were not good at getting 
information from their guys and listening to 
their guys, and coming to me with something that 
made any sense…Understanding the communication 
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flow that I expected from the chain of command 
was something they just didn’t get when they 
first started working onboard.
Lastly, a former Commanding Officer said that one skill she 
wished her DIVOs could have improved on was listening.  She 
said:
I think the first skill, and I call it a skill, 
is listening.  DIVOs have to know their people, 
and know how to listen to their people, and I 
mean listen to them about professional stuff and 
personal stuff…And then know how to recognize and 
identify problems and relay that information to 
the right people.
The last Officership education need that was 
identified was possessing, and outwardly demonstrating, a 
deep feeling of responsibility for the sailors who worked 
in the Division. Again, this theme was difficult to extract 
and identify, but was present in data gathered from all 
respondent groups. The ability to relate to enlisted 
sailors in a way that effectively promotes mutual respect, 
responsibility, and positive change in the professional and 
personal lives of the sailors they are charged with 
leading, seems to be a prevalent need according to Fleet 
leadership.  One PCO said:
We went up to Great Lakes a few weeks ago, to see 
recruits and one of the things it did was sort of 
re-instill an incredible sense of responsibility 
in me, and perhaps that is one of the things that 
we (COs) sense is missing, you know an intense 
responsibility for the people below you…I worked 
at JFPAC with Marines and you know they don’t eat 
before their men, and every thought they had was 
what is going on with their men…and I am not sure 
what accounts for that difference between the 
Marines I saw and the Ensigns on my ship.
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Another PCO said:
I am an ROTC grad…As an ROTC grad I have always 
looked at the Naval Academy guys and said, man, 
these guys have a warped sense of what it means 
to be a Division Officer…They all had an 
attitude. And I always thought, and maybe it is 
self-serving, but I always thought that the ROTC 
guys understood or related to the guys that were 
working for them a little better…were a little 
more humble maybe. 
Finally, when asked what she would emphasize to an Ensign 
heading to a ship, a former CO remarked:
I would really emphasize engagement… Meaning that 
JOs need to understand that it is OK for you to 
ask Seaman Timmy how he is doing, how his wife is 
doing, how’s their new baby doing, how’s your 
financial situation doing…you know not being 
hesitant to be involved with their people, 
including their peers…It seems like they are 
afraid to get involved, or don’t know that they 
should get involved, when in fact they have a 
responsibility to get involved…
c. Understanding and Using Power: Assertiveness
During the research a general theme of SWO 
Ensigns either not understanding or failing to use their 
positional power was another affective need that emerged. 
Twelve out of fourteen COs, PCOs, and PXOs said that in 
general, they believed their Junior Officers need to be 
more assertive in their roles.  Additionally, three Ensigns 
said that from what they have seen, Junior Officers need to 
be more assertive. When asked if there were any common, 
poignant deficiencies that he has seen in JOs in the Fleet, 
one former CO said:
From my perspective it (a deficiency) is taking 
charge, being aggressive…What Captains want to 
see is their DIVOs being aggressive…Most of them 
have that in them, they just don’t know when to 
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apply it.  They think they are too junior, they 
don’t think they have the legitimacy, or 
whatever…they don’t realize how much power they 
have…They (sailors) are expecting their DIVOs to 
lead them, and lead them aggressively, just 
stepping forward…What I see are the ones that do 
that, really outperform the other ones.
One PCO said that as an Executive Officer, he tried to 
impress upon his DIVOs that it was their duty to correct 
sailors and give orders on the spot.  He said:
I had trouble getting my DIVOs to just do the 
basics.  The things that my Department Head and 
XO beat into us when I was a DIVO.  Things like 
supervising sweepers, keeping spaces clean, spot-
checking their spaces for gear adrift, and even 
keeping their own staterooms clean. Things like 
that…
The same PCO went on to say that he believes he has noticed 
a general trend of ships elevating the positional power of 
the Chief Petty Officers to the point where DIVOs are 
essentially rendered obsolete.  He was visibly distressed 
by what he was saying, and then remarked:
You know, when I was a DIVO, I felt like I was 
prepared, and understood that it was my 
responsibility to train my Chief every now and 
then. They don’t know everything and JOs need to 
realize that. The DIVO/Chief team is there to 
support each other. The DIVO can’t defer to the 
Chief on every issue…Not once on my last ship did 
I see or hear of a DIVO standing up to his or her 
chief over something that was important…That 
would have made me happy.
Additionally, when asked what KSAAs Ensigns should possess
when they arrive onboard, one Ensign’s first answer was:
He needs to have assertiveness.  He can’t be 
pushed over just because he is the new Ensign, 
because once it happens…
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In response to the interviewer asking if he had seen 
that happen, the Ensign said:
Yeah, I saw it a lot on my ship.  You know the 
Ensigns being almost taken advantage of because 
they were seen as being new and young and 
inexperienced.
d. Confidence
Confidence is the fourth affective need 
identified in the research.  Confidence was cited in every 
interview and focus group, and along with motivation and 
initiative was the most frequently mentioned educational 
need.  Unlike the other leadership-oriented needs, 
confidence was a theme identified very often in the NL401 
focus group and Prospective Department Head interviews in 
the context of bridge watchstanding.  One NL401 instructor 
said that the most important difference between a 
Midshipman on the first day of class and an Ensign on his 
first day onboard is confidence.  Furthermore, the PCO and 
PXO group cited confidence in dealing with superiors, 
Senior Enlisted, and on the bridge as a need that sets high 
performers apart from their peers.  One PXO said:
I won’t support qualifying a JO as an OOD if they 
aren’t confident up there.  And I have seen a lot 
of Ensigns who are smart, they are good 
shipdrivers, and whatever, but they didn’t know 
that they were…A Captain won’t be confident in 
them if they are not confident in their own 
abilities…It really has hurt some of their 
progress from what I have seen.   
e. Enthusiasm, Motivation, and Initiative 
The fifth and last affective need of SWO JOs is a 
sense of enthusiasm, motivation, and initiative. All SWO 
leadership respondents commented that these qualities 
separated their top performers from sub-standard 
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performers, and eight out of sixteen NL401 instructors 
considered either enthusiasm, motivation or initiative to 
be a top-five KSAA.  One PCO remarked:
The division officers I saw that were failing 
lacked motivation and initiative.  You hear this 
a lot from a lot of different people.  You know 
Captains saying they secured all TVs on the ship 
because they can’t get their divos out of their 
staterooms during the day… 
When asked where or if a distinction could be drawn between 
the commissioning source and the command with respect to 
responsibilities for training and educating Ensigns, one 
PCO said:
Well don’t forget about the individual.  I 
believe both are ultimately responsible, but a 
lot of onus is placed on that Ensign as 
well…Especially with DOSP, there is an 
expectation that they have the initiative to 
learn on their own, and not just learn what is on 
the CDs, but go out on their own, walk around the 
ship and the Division, and apply the knowledge 
that they learn from the CDs.  
Based on the data collected from PCOs, PXOs and Department 
Heads there seems to be a theme of Division Officers 
lacking the initiative or assertiveness to insert 
themselves into the daily operations of their divisions.  
One PCO speculated that one possible source of this
perceived trend could be that Ensigns who didn’t go to SWOS 
lack the knowledge of procedures and policies relating to 
these issues, and are therefore hesitant to assert 
themselves. He also said that “it was distressing as a CO 
to see Ensigns and DIVOs not showing that they wanted to be 
involved.” 
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2. Cognitive Needs of SWO JOs
Cognitive needs of SWO JOs were identified in the 
research as the second educational expectations and 
requirements of SWO Junior Officers.  Cognitive needs are a 
domain of learner behavior that includes knowledge and the 
development of what may be thought of as intellectual 
skills.  Unlike the affective domain, the cognitive domain 
can be thought of as a process.  In other words, in order 
to maximize an individual’s cognitive potential, he or she 
must first absorb knowledge, then comprehend that 
knowledge, be able to apply it in unique situations, be 
able to use it in analyzing a situation, synthesize 
different pieces of knowledge, and eventually use that 
knowledge to make evaluations regarding ideas, procedures, 
or materials (Krathwohl, D. R., Bloom, B. S., & Bertram, B. 
M., 1973). Arguably, this process is what a “true” capstone 
course seeks to accomplish in its students; these needs 
promote critical thinking and decision making. 
The cognitive needs of Surface Warfare Junior Officers 
are relatively broad and harder to explicitly identify than 
other types of training and educational needs. 
Additionally, Junior Officer’s cognitive process must 
continually evolve as they progress through their career.  
For the purposes of this research, cognitive SWO JO 
educational needs are separated into two categories.  The 
first category includes those needs that are essential for 
their success as Division Officers and bridge 
watchstanders.  The second category pertains to the 
cognitive skills that are required of the most junior 
officers in an organization that only promotes from within, 
and expects all of its JOs to become higher-level leaders.
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At a very basic level, Division Officers are expected 
to comprehend the function and operation of their 
equipment, and have enough knowledge to understand basic 
trouble-shooting procedures.  These needs are specific to 
certain shipboard billets.  They must also have enough 
knowledge of all shipboard systems to understand how their 
equipment affects the ship’s mission, and other divisions 
and departments. Along the same lines, as watchstanders 
they must have enough understanding of the relationships 
among equipment, procedures, and operational environment, 
to make time-sensitive decisions that may affect the safety 
of the ship. These cognitive needs can be thought of as 
what would be taught at the five-month SWOSDOC, the DOSP 
computer-based training modules, at a billet specific 
school, and/or onboard the ship.  Many argue they are most 
easily learned through hands-on experience. Surprisingly, 
cognitive Division Officer and watchstanding needs rarely 
emerged in this research.  This researcher hypothesizes 
that there is an assumption among Fleet leaders that JOs 
will acquire these cognitive knowledge and skills once they 
arrive onboard their first ship.  Therefore, very little 
analysis of this type of data will be conducted. 
Junior Officers must also possess a basic set of 
knowledge and skills that can be built upon to ensure that 
they are prepared to be leaders at each stage of their 
career. This level of cognitive needs can be thought of as 
what Midshipmen are taught in History and Naval Science 
courses such as NS310, Strategy and Tactics.  Examples that 
emerged in the research are, understanding the current geo-
political environment, understanding the mission of the 
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Navy in the context of U.S. National policy and strategy, 
Surface Warfare weapon systems and basic tactics, and joint 
military operations.
a. DIVO and Watchstanding Cognitive Educational 
Needs
Very little data emerged in the research 
regarding this need set.  The respondent groups that 
mentioned these types of needs most frequently were the 
Prospective Department Heads and NL401 instructors. No 
former COs or Ensigns, and only one PCO, and two PXOs spoke 
of these needs-- but only briefly. Additionally, no 
Division Officer-specific needs emerged; they all pertained 
to general shipboard knowledge and bridge watchstanding.  
Table 10 illustrates the needs identified and how 
frequently they were mentioned:
Respondent Groups (# of participants)











Damage Control 4 0 1 1 2 0 8
Engineering 
Principles
3 0 0 0 1 0 4
Combat Systems 3 0 0 0 1 0 4
Table 10.  Cognitive DIVO and Watchstanding Needs
Data suggest that Fleet leaders assume that Division 
Officer-specific cognitive needs are best addressed during 
billet-specific training schools following commissioning.  
Additionally, it appears that Damage Control knowledge is 
the most important watchstanding cognitive need according 
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to the active-duty stakeholders. After listing two bridge 
watchstanding training related KSAAs, standard commands and 
moboards, one PXO said:
I will add one more thing…Damage Control. You 
know it is just one of those things that everyone 
onboard needs, is required to know, and as a 
bridge watchstander they have to know how to use 
some of the equipment, you know, what is at their 
disposal…
In response to the interviewers question about whether 
they need that right away when they show up, the PXO 
said:
Yes.  I guess the level of knowledge I expect is 
that when they get there, Ensigns know more than 
a deck seaman.  You get that stuff at boot camp, 
so they should get it at the Academy.
b. Strategy and Tactics Cognitive Educational 
Needs
Strategy and tactics cognitive educational needs 
emerged most often in the DMP/PMP focus group, but also 
within the higher-echelon respondent groups.  Again, the 
DMP/PMP group of stakeholders is comprised of active-duty, 
retired, and reserve officers of the rank of O-5 (Navy 
Commander) or O-6 (Navy Captain) who are teaching at the 
Naval Academy. However, their educational backgrounds and 
their current jobs as leadership, ethics, character, and 
professional development professors set them apart from 
other respondents.  Data from this group indicate that they 
are primarily concerned with preparing Midshipmen to be 
Junior Officers by providing them with the cognitive skills 
associated with being a Naval Officer.  Data suggest that 
critical thinking and decision making in the context of the 
current geo-political and national strategic environment 
are very important to them. It is also important to note 
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that discussion in this focus group concentrated on the 
appropriate structure of the USNA Leadership Capstone 
Course, and data regarding cognitive educational needs were 
gleaned from such discussion. The following paragraph 
provides data from the DMP/PMP focus group.
One DMP, a Colonel in the Marine Corps reserve, 
said:
As a commander at a higher level, I would hope 
that my Junior Officers are some of the most 
adaptable, creative, and critical thinkers out 
there.
Another DMP, a retired Navy Captain, mentioned that he was 
concerned with feedback from the Fleet regarding the way 
Ensigns are currently utilized.  He said:
What I am hearing [from the Fleet] is that now we 
want, the COs want, Ensigns to be able to come 
out and run 3M programs and things like that. And 
I was always under the impression in Command that 
my wardroom learned how to fight the ship…we get 
the ship underway, we go into combat, and we 
bring it back.  That is the function of the 
Wardroom.
The Marine Colonel illustrates what he believes to be 
necessity of understanding current geo-political 
environment by saying:
The decision of whether to arm your Marines or 
sailors with weapons as they go into Indonesia, 
or not have them because of the political 
ramifications…they weren’t worried about that in 
1940. We are. And that is going to become even 
more so as young officers are having to make 
those kind of decisions when they are sent out as 
task force commanders or whatever Admiral Mullen 
is thinking about doing with young Ensigns.  I 
think he is going to be very aggressive and these 
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guys are going to be very involved with unique 
circumstances that have very little to do with 
what we are used to doing.
The active duty SWO respondents also commented on 
cognitive needs, but less frequently than other need 
groups, and only joint operations emerged as a theme. One 
former CO and three out of six PCOs mentioned and 
understanding of joint operations as a perceived need.  One 
PCO said:
I think you take that time and you, I mean look 
at the War College, I mean you are in an academic 
environment there at the Naval Academy.  Look at 
other academic institutions of higher learning 
around here…maybe that is the time to start 
introducing Sun Tzu and Clausewitz and all that 
stuff, to all these lads and lasses, they are in 
a receptive mode for that type of stuff.  And 
look at the broader development of SWOs down the 
road…right now there is almost a crisis because 
O-6s are punching out of the Navy and the O-5s 
don’t have their JPME.  And we’re not developing 
joint officers.  Why don’t we teach Division 
Officers the commander’s estimate of the 
situation, which is the War College version of 
how to do joint military operations.  Let’s start 
teaching midshipmen how to be joint and maybe 
we’ll get a better product down the road. 
A former CO said:
On the education side, I think it is important 
that they understand the mission of the Navy, and 
how Navy operations fit into the joint military 
environment.  When I was CO the first half of our 
deployment we were working with the Air Force and 
Army helping them detect and locate TBMs (Theater 
Ballistic Missiles).  The second half we were out 
in CTF 150 doing MIO (Maritime Interdiction 
Operations) and surveillance with like, I think 
it was six different Navies…So that stuff is very 
relevant for a JO. They should be learning that 
joint stuff earlier in their careers than I 
certainly did.
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To provide further clarification, CTF 150 is a coalition 
task force that is responsible for command and control of 
interdiction operations in the Central Command area of 
responsibility. 
3. Positive Attributes of USNA Graduates
Unlike training attributes, positive educational 
attributes of USNA graduates were rarely mentioned during 
the data collection process. Only three respondents, both 
former COs and a PCO, mentioned an educational attribute, 
and it is therefore difficult to speculate on whether or 
not USNA Ensigns outperform their peers in these areas.  
One former CO said that her Naval Academy graduates:
...were all very respectful, I found them to be 
respectful, I mean I was the Captain too, but I 
thought they…did a good job of trying to balance 
things in their lives.  I think they understood 
the importance of working out, the importance of 
having fun, the importance of working hard, um 
and how that all needs to balance.
Another former CO said that all of his USNA graduates were 
inquisitive, and said:
And I find the Academy guys know where to stop 
with their questioning attitude, and I like that.  
I see that as a good thing…And I guess the 
Academy guys just had a better sense of military 
bearing when it came to dealing with superior 
officers. 
E. SUMMARY AND PRIORITIZATION OF KSAA’S AND COMPETENCIES
This section of the research provides a brief summary 
and prioritization of previously mentioned data themes. 
Overall, the most frequently mentioned needs were 
associated with training, but data suggest that the most 
poignant deficiencies or gaps involve educational needs. 
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With respect to training needs, Division Officer knowledge 
and skills were more important to stakeholders than
watchstanding needs.  With respect to educational needs, 
the affective domain was more important to stakeholders 
than the cognitive.  The following provides a 
comprehensive, prioritized list of themes regarding 






 Enthusiasm, Motivation and Initiative
 Cognitive Needs
 Strategy and Tactics
 DIVO and Watchstanding Cognitive Needs
 Division Officer Training Needs
 Shipboard and Divisional Organization
 Maintenance and Material Management
 Personnel System Knowledge and 
Management
 Soft Skills: Writing and Public 
Speaking
 Watchstanding Training Needs
 Maneuvering Boards
 Standard Commands
 Navigation and Shiphandling Principles
 Rules of the Road 
Additionally, data suggest that Ensigns who currently 
report to their first command should be able to approach 
the performance levels of those who attended five months of 
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Division Officer school at SWOS. It appears that DOSP 
computer-based training provides Ensigns with most of the 
training and cognitive educational DIVO and watchstanding 
needs that they must fulfill to be successful.  The 
following section provides data relating to stakeholder 
perceptions of how NL401 should be structured.
F. INTERVIEWEE AND FOCUS GROUP INPUT REGARDING THE 
STRUCTURE OF NL401: DOME, SPIRE, OR BOTH?
The primary question this study seeks to answer is, 
how should NL401 be structured, so that a balance is struck 
between character, ethical, and leadership education, and 
practical training, so that the inherent educational and 
training opportunities are maximized.  In the following 
chapter, this question will be attempted to be answered 
according to themes identified in the previously discussed 
data, supplemented by interviewee and focus group subjects’ 
responses to direct questions on the topic.  This type of 
data was primarily collected from the DMP/PMP focus group, 
but other groups of respondents were occasionally probed 
with these questions outlined in Chapter Three:
 Can a capstone provide both closure and further 
exploration?
 Can both be accomplished in the time allotted?
 Since the goals seem to move in opposite 
directions, is one cancelled out by including the 
other?
 If we are forced to chose between the two, which 
should be emphasized?
Data in this section will be presented according to 
the type of capstone structure it supports.  First, support 
for a dome structure will be discussed, and will be 
followed by a discussion of support for a spire.  Finally, 
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data that indicates NL401 should be structured to provide 
both closure and further exploration will be presented.
1. Support for a Dome Structure
Support for structuring NL401 as a capstone that 
provides closure to the USNA experience was found most 
frequently in the NL401 Instructor and DMP/PMP focus 
groups.  However, their interpretations of what a true 
culminating capstone should look like, and the content that 
should be addressed, were entirely different.
The NL401 Instructor focus group, was overwhelmingly 
supportive of structuring to course to provide closure to 
what they refer to as the maritime continuum.  The maritime 
continuum includes all aspects of the Midshipman 
professional development experience, but is focused on 
ensuring proficiency in maritime skills. NS100, NN204, gray 
hull cruise, YPs, and CSNTS are integral parts of this
program.  Only one respondent in this group stated a belief 
that the course should do more than culminate the maritime 
continuum.  The course coordinator said:
[NL401] is a culmination of the time that they 
are going to spend in this thing described as the 
maritime continuum. The maritime continuum is 
where they are going stairstep build this package 
of maritime skills, and 401 is an opportunity to 
sortof revisit some of those skills and practice 
some of those skills. 
These sentiments were echoed throughout the focus group.  
Data indicate that they are primarily concerned with 
ensuring Midshipmen graduate with the maritime and 
watchstanding skills that they are expected to gain during 
this continuum, and do not see NL401 as an opportunity to 
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significantly address education and training in Division 
Officer leadership and management skills. 
Although support for this type of structure was found 
in the DMP/PMP focus group, it was not as overwhelming, and 
their opinions of what material should be culminated were 
much broader.  Several comments were made indicating that 
individuals with this type of academic and operational 
backgrounds are likely to conceptualize a true capstone as 
having a dome structure.  One said:
I see it as an opportunity to put everything you 
have learned together into one big problem…It 
should be something that takes everything they 
have learned, and I mean seamanship and 
navigation, history, everything, and bring it 
together in some type of Final Battle Problem…  
That is my interpretation of what a capstone 
should do.
The Chairman of the Leadership Ethics and Law Department 
said:
When I think of a capstone, I think of something 
that ties together all the leadership experiences 
a Midshipman has had while they are here, with 
the other disciplines…It should bring all the 
behavioral science, character, and ethics courses 
together with some sort of Midshipmen focused 
leadership problem…
Therefore, it appears that interpretations of what a 
capstone should accomplish are much broader among these 
respondents.  Data indicate that approximately fifty 
percent of these respondents believe NL401 should be a 
dome. 
2. Support for a Spire Structure
Support for structuring NL401 to provide further 
exploration into the duties and responsibilities of SWO 
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Division Officers, and Naval Officers in general, was most 
frequently found in the Fleet respondent groups. Data 
indicate that at least eighty percent of the former COs, 
PCOs, PXOs, prospective Department Heads, and Ensigns, 
believe the purpose of the course should be to prepare 
Midshipmen to become proficient in management skills they 
will need as Division Officers.  This is clearly evident in 
the previously discussed data.  One former CO said: 
To prepare an Officer to benefit the ship the 
best, it is the Division Officer skills that 
should be taught.  We will get meaningful work on 
day one from that Ensign as a Division Officer.
Again, data suggests that most Fleet respondents believe 
the course should educate and train Midshipmen in Division 
Officer and watchstanding skills, but the emphasis should 
be placed on Division Officer leadership and management 
proficiencies.  
3. For and Against Closure and Further Exploration
Support for structuring NL401 as a combination of dome 
and spire was extremely limited.  Additionally, the NL401 
Instructor respondent group provided arguments against 
attempting to provide further exploration in the time 
allotted for the course.  The following comment by the 
course coordinator summarizes the sentiments of this group:
From the opinion of somebody who taught it last 
semester or taught it last year, and somebody who 
was responsible for it for a couple of years, the 
worst parts of the course…were the parts where we 
were trying to replace SWOS… We just can’t do it 
in the amount of time that we have.
The following paragraph outlines data that support a 
combination of the two philosophies.  
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Support for attempting to accomplish both closure for 
the leadership continuum and USNA experience, and further 
exploration into the duties and responsibilities of Naval 
Officers was only found in data from the DMP/PMP focus 
group.  Approximately forty percent of these respondents 
support this type of structure.  It is important to note 
however, that unlike other interviews and focus groups, 
discussion during this event was centered on the 
appropriate structure of the course.  These respondents 
were prompted with a brief overview of the dome and spire, 
and all others were not.  One respondent stated:
We are under a significant amount of pressure to 
make the curriculum more Midshipmen focused, more 
focused on the Midshipman experience.  I think 
the right thing to do is make it more Fleet 
focused.  And I think the answer may be to do 
both…I think we can do both.
Another DMP said:
I don’t think we can say that this course is only 
a culmination of experiences at the Naval 
Academy…I don’t even think we should focus only 
on preparing them for day one [on the job]…Part 
of it is day one, but I’ll take the Marine Corps 
example…the second part would be preparing them 
for Expeditionary Warfare School…and the third is 
hopefully an underlying foundation of what it is 
to lead, the officership piece.  We do a 
disservice if we aim at making them, using the 
Marine Corps example again, making them prepared 
to be a Captain.
These data indicate support for structuring the course to 
not only prepare Midshipmen for their next job in the 




The purpose of this chapter was to present data 
collected from focus groups and during interviews.  Data 
was presented according to themes identified during the 
research.  First, data which provides historical 
perspective regarding the expectations of Junior SWOs was 
discussed.  Next, stakeholder perceptions of Division 
Officer and watchstanding training needs were presented and 
related KSAAs were identified and discussed. Then 
perceptions regarding the educational needs of Midshipmen 
enrolled in NL401 were presented, along with related KSAAs.  
Next, the SWO JO KSAAs that were identified in the research 
were summarized and prioritized.  Finally, data relating to 
stakeholder opinions of how NL401 should be structured was 
presented and discussed. These data will be used along with 
previously discussed literature to summarize the findings, 
draw conclusions regarding the research questions, and make 
recommendations for improving the structure of NL401. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This research will be used to improve the performance 
of SWO Junior Officers during their initial at-sea Division 
Officer tours.  The purpose of this research was to use 
qualitative data to determine how the USNA SWO Leadership 
Capstone Course (NL401) should be structured so that the 
education and training potential of the course is 
maximized, and to determine the appropriate balance between 
leadership education and practical training. Additionally, 
interview and focus group data was used to identify and 
prioritize knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes that 
may improve SWO Ensigns’ performance during the first few 
months of their initial at-sea Division Officer tour. 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the 
results and findings of the data analysis. Furthermore, 
this chapter will be used to discuss the relationship 
between the findings and current USNA academic policy, 
leadership and professional education curricula, USNA 
education and training programs, and current Fleet 
policies, namely DOSP. This chapter will be organized into 
three sections.  First, a summary of findings will be 
presented. Next conclusions drawn from the data will be 
discussed.  Finally, recommendations based on the data, 
literature, and background will be made.  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING NEEDS
As mentioned in Chapters III and IV, this educational 
and training needs assessment was designed to help make a 
determination regarding potential gaps in the training and 
education objectives of NL401.  These gaps, or needs, were 
128
identified and prioritized during data analysis, and 
thereby used to draw conclusions on the most appropriate 
course structure.  The researcher will discuss the needs 
identified during the assessment.
1. Division Officer at Sea Program
Determining whether or not the Division Officer at Sea 
Program is a success, is well outside the scope of this 
research.  However, because DOSP is a recent, fundamental 
change in the way SWOs train their Junior Officers, a needs 
assessment of NL401 must be conducted in the context of 
this program.  Additionally, it was difficult to conduct 
interviews with active-duty SWOs without discussing DOSP in
detail by respondents.  Much of that type of data was 
irrelevant to research needs, but some proved to be useful.  
DOSP data indicate that the Fleet expects Ensigns to report 
aboard their first ship and immediately fulfill a Division 
Officer role.  In order for ensigns to be prepared to 
assume these duties and responsibilities, they must be 
educated and trained in key areas that will be discussed 
throughout this chapter. Additionally, data indicate that 
the DOSP process is gaining acceptance in the Fleet, and 
ensigns who are commissioned under the program can approach 
leadership and management performance levels similar to 
those who attended the traditional SWOS Division Officer 
Course.  The burden of preparing them has shifted from SWOS 




2. Education and Training Needs, Gaps Identified, 
and Prioritization of Needs
Data indicate that significant educational and 
training needs should be addressed in NL401.  The following 
paragraphs outline the findings that pertain to these 
needs.  The findings are presented in the order of priority 
determined during data analysis.  Here it is important to 
again note the qualitative nature of this research.  The 
reality of NL401 is socially constructed; the course 
content, teaching methods, and effectiveness are dependent 
on each particular instructor, and the students in each 
section, among other factors.  Additionally, the variables 
are not objective nor easily reduced to numbers.  The 
answers to each research question rely upon complex 
analysis of interwoven variables that proved extremely 
difficult to measure.  Care was taken by the researcher to 
maintain objectivity when analyzing data and drawing 
conclusions.  However, it was impossible in this case to 
eliminate all subjectivity.  
a. Education versus Training Needs
Analysis of the data shows that NL401 should be 
designed to satisfy both the educational and training needs 
of SWO junior officers.  However, data indicate that needs 
oriented along educational lines will have the greatest 
influence on overall JO performance. Although Fleet 
stakeholders tended to initially concentrate their 
discussion on training needs and shortcomings, once probed, 
respondents provided ample data to support a need for 
education focused on the SWO JO at the commissioning 
source.  The educational needs identified spanned both the 
affective and cognitive domains of learner behavior. 
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b. Affective versus Cognitive Educational Needs 
Data indicate that educational needs of SWO JOs 
include the affective and cognitive domains of learner 
behavior and are more associated with leadership than 
management.  Also, data indicate that affective needs will 
have a greater impact on performance than any other 
training or educational need, and the gaps identified were 
most distressing; these are the factors collectively 
labeled “character.”  The affective needs identified were, 
in order of precedence:
 Foundational Values: Integrity, Honor, Moral 
Courage
 Officership Values: Knowing their people, 
Engaging their people, Setting the example
 Realizing, understanding, and using their power: 
Intrusive leadership and Assertiveness 
 Confidence 
 Enthusiasm, Motivation, and Initiative
Data indicate that cognitive educational needs 
should be prioritized as the next most important 
educational need. But, using the data, a determination of 
where these needs should be prioritized in the overall 
NL401 curriculum could not be objectively determined.  The 
DMP/PMP focus group seem to believe, although not 
unanimously, that teaching cognitive skills should take 
precedence in the course, and is what a capstone should be 
designed to do.  No other respondent groups shared similar 
concerns, which is probably attributable to differences in 
academic backgrounds. The cognitive needs identified were 
strategy and tactics, and Division Officer and 
watchstanding cognitive needs.  Strategy and tactics needs 
include geo-political considerations, National Security 
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strategy, and joint military operations. Division Officer 
and watchstanding cognitive needs that were identified are, 
in order of precedence: 
 Damage Control Fundamentals
 Engineering Principles
 Combat Systems Fundamentals
The following paragraphs provide a summary of the training 
needs identified in the research.
c. Division Officer versus Watchstanding 
Training Needs
Training needs identified during the research 
were specific knowledge and skill requirements that enable 
a SWO JO to perform the duties of a Division Officer and 
the duties of a bridge watchstander.  When analyzing the 
data, a clear division among respondent groups emerged.  
Former COs, PCOs, and PXOs seem to believe that 
commissioning source training should focus on Division 
Officer needs, while NL401 instructors (two Lieutenant 
Commanders, and fourteen Lieutenants) and Prospective 
Department Heads believe that training should focus on 
bridge watchstanding needs. However, many of the junior 
respondents contradicted themselves by indicating that they 
expect ensigns to check onboard with the watchstanding 
skills that should be learned on summer cruise. This 
researcher hypothesizes that the disparity is caused by 
misconceptions and inadequate knowledge of the Division 
Officer at Sea Program in the more junior ranks of Surface 
Warfare Officers.  Specifically, it appears that these 
junior respondent groups either do not know about, or do 
not agree with the DOSP policy requiring JOs to be Division 
Officers immediately upon their arrival to their first 
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ship. Data indicate that Division Officer training needs 
should take precedence over watchstanding training needs in 
the SWO leadership capstone.
Several Division Officer training needs were 
identified in the research. They are, in order of 
precedence:
 General Shipboard Organization and Practices
 Maintenance and Material Management
 Personnel System Knowledge and Management
 Soft-Skill Division Officer training needs such 
as professional writing and public speaking
Training gaps were associated with all of these needs 
except soft skills. The watchstanding needs identified are, 
in order of precedence:
 Maneuvering Boards
 Standard Commands
 Navigation and Shiphandling Principles
 Rules of the Road
Here again, it was difficult to determine the significance 
of training gaps associated with these needs.  However, 
data provide enough evidence to determine that these needs 
are extremely important to some stakeholders, particularly 
the NL401 instructors, Prospective Department Heads, and 
Ensigns.
d. Competencies
Data indicate that core SWO JO competencies that 
should be addressed by NL401 are primarily focused in 
Parry’s administrative and cognitive competency groups. All  
stakeholders indicate that they are primarily concerned 
with a Division Officer’s ability to manage time, 
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prioritize, set goals and enforce standards, plan and 
schedule work, identify and solve problems, make decisions 
while weighing risks, and think clearly and analytically.  
The supervisory competency group seems to be the second 
most important competency group, and includes training, 
delegating, evaluating performance, disciplining, and 
counseling.  The third most important group seems to be the 
communication group, which consists of listening and 
organizing, giving clear information, and getting unbiased 
information.  This prioritization of competency groups will 
aid in making a determination of how NL401 should be 
structured, and can be used in future curriculum design.  
B. CONCLUSIONS
The following paragraphs present conclusions to the 
research questions that have been drawn from the data 
analysis.  First, conclusions regarding potential problems 
with the current NL401 structure and content will be 
presented.  Next, a conclusion regarding the general 
effectiveness of the leadership continuum presented in 
Chapter Two will be discussed.  Finally, conclusions to the 
primary research question will be presented. 
1. Problems Identified Regarding Current NL401 
Structure and Curriculum Content
The following paragraphs outline potential problems 
with the current NL401 structure and content.  Based on 
data analyzed in Chapter Five, and literature presented in 
Chapters Two and Three, it appears that the theory behind 
the course and the purpose of NL401 are contradicted by the 
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way in which it is taught. Furthermore, it appears that 
some of the potential problems with implementing a capstone 
are manifested in the course. 
a. Problem One: NL401 Vision and Reality
The first problem with NL401 is that the course 
vision, promulgated by DMPs and PMPs, either is not 
communicated well to the instructors, and/or is not 
internalized by them.  It seems that the transition of 
responsibility for the course from PRODEV to ODEV, from 
practicum to capstone, has only really occurred at the 
DMP/PMP level (in theory), and is yet to take effect at the 
instructor level (in practice).  Data indicate that the 
current NL401 curriculum is structured primarily as a dome 
(providing closure for the curriculum), with a small 
portion of the course dedicated to promoting further 
exploration (preparing students for their next job as 
Surface Warfare Division Officers).  Members of the NL401 
and DMP/PMP focus groups, those responsible for 
implementing and designing the curriculum respectively, 
explicitly stated that when they think of a capstone at the 
Naval Academy they think of a dome.  However, the vision of 
NL401 is for the course to be a culminating experience in 
the areas of leadership, ethical, and character 
development, and to prepare Midshipmen for their transition 
to becoming Surface Warfare Officers – the vision implies 
some sort of balance of dome and spire characteristics.  
However, data indicate that in reality, a disproportionate 
amount of instruction time is spent culminating the 
Maritime Continuum, and very little, if any, is spent on
leadership, character, and ethical development.  The 
following statement made by a Lieutenant Commander NL401 
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instructor illustrates this point, but did not fit well 
under the results chapter subheadings.  He said:
I had a section of around fifty, and two of them 
could do basic tracking problems on a moboard 
when we started last year.  By the end of the 
semester they all had confidence that they could 
do it.
This statement seems to imply that an entire semester was 
spent ensuring Midshipmen were trained in how to do a 
moboard. Therefore data indicate that the Surface Warfare 
Junior Officers who teach the course focus on the needs 
they believe are important.  Additionally, regardless of 
the current course structure and balance, several problems 
associated with implementing a capstone course are 
manifested in the curriculum and/or its instruction.
b. Problem Two: NL401 as a Dome
The current NL401 curriculum and instruction 
method reveals one problem identified by Heinemann, and 
referenced in Chapter Three of this research.  A 
preponderance of data indicate that the course focuses on 
reviewing material previously covered in the maritime 
continuum.  This material is not integrated into any other 
disciplines, resulting in a repeat of training, with no 
overall synthesis. If this is the case, and it seems like 
it is, NL401 really doesn’t qualify as a capstone course, 
and practicum would be a more appropriate term to describe 
it.   
c. Problem Three: NL401 as a Spire
Some data indicate that NL401 is currently 
structured as a spire.  The curriculum outlined in Chapter 
Two seems to follow a spire structure, and most NL401 
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instructors risked contradicting themselves by professing 
their belief that the most beneficial aspect of the course 
was the ability for Lieutenants who recently served on 
ships to answer direct questions pertaining to what “the 
real Navy” was like.  This may indeed be beneficial for 
Midshipmen, but if too much emphasis is placed on what 
Heinemann calls personally relevant and practical material, 
the course quickly becomes petty and superficial.  This may 
be why Midshipmen refer to the course as “leadersleep.” 
Emphasizing only practical material, some of which has 
previously been repeatedly covered in the maritime and 
leadership continuums, cannot be stimulating for the 
students.   
2. The Role of NL401 in the Overall Effectiveness of 
the Leadership Continuum
Based on the data analysis, this researcher concludes 
that the leadership continuum is effective for training 
Surface Warfare Officers.  The opportunities it presents 
for the leadership, character, ethical, and professional 
development of Midshipmen, provide ample instruction and 
practical application time for each student to be a 
successful Naval Officer.  It provides great potential for 
USNA to remain the premier accession source for Surface 
Warfare Officers.  The use of YPs, the sailing program, 
simulators, summer training, and leadership opportunities 
for each Midshipman provide the potential for USNA to 
produce a far superior product than alternative 
commissioning sources. However, because service selection 
occurs at the end of Fall Semester of Senior Year, much of 
the continuum may be viewed by Midshipmen as being 
personally irrelevant.  Data indicate that some Midshipmen 
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may not be taking advantage of the opportunities presented 
in the continuum, or at least arrive at NL401 with vastly 
different proficiencies.  Thus NL401 is critical to capping 
off this continuum and ensuring that each Midshipman who 
will become a SWO graduates with a minimum of educational 
and training needs met.
3. How Should NL401 be Structured?
Determining how NL401 should be structured so that a 
balance is struck between meeting the educational and 
training needs of the Midshipmen is the primary research 
question addressed in this thesis.  Analysis of data 
collected during the needs assessment indicates that 
according to stakeholders, educational needs, particularly 
the affective and cognitive domains of learner behavior, 
should be a higher priority in curricula that prepare 
Midshipmen for Surface Warfare Officers than training 
needs.  Furthermore, it appears that the leadership 
continuum, and its subordinate maritime continuum, is an 
effective means of training Midshipmen in maritime skills.  
The following paragraphs draw conclusions for each of the 
questions posed by Heinemann in Chapter Three, which are 
critical to answering this research question.  They are: 
1. Can NL401 provide both closure and further 
exploration?
2. Can both be accomplished in the time allotted?
3. Since the goals seem to move in opposite 
directions, is one cancelled out by including the 
other?
4. If we are forced to chose between the two, which 
should be emphasized?
(Cited: Heinemann, R., 1997, p.1)
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These questions will be discussed, conclusions drawn, and 
finally a determination of the appropriate structure of the 
course will be made.
a. Can NL401 Provide both Closure and Further 
Exploration?
According to the data, literature, and policies, 
NL401 can provide both closure to the leadership and 
maritime continuums and further exploration into the duties 
and responsibilities of Surface Warfare Officers. A 
combination is desirable and achievable.  Although data 
indicate that the “worst” parts of the course were those 
that tried to replace the five-month SWOS, the time 
allotted for instruction seems to indicate that with 
careful planning, both can be accomplished. DOSP does not 
require or recommend that commissioning sources attempt to 
replace SWOS. Midshipmen experiences within the leadership 
and maritime continuums should reinforce the skills taught 
in NL100, NN204 and other core courses, so that by the time 
a Midshipman is in his or her last semester, there should 
be very little training required in the areas of maritime 
skills.  These experiences accomplish several of the steps 
Heinemann recommends taking to improve the success rate of 
an integrated structure.
The first suggestion is that a major should have 
a complimentary entry course that prepares students for the 
entire major.  This is accomplished by NL100, NE203, NN204, 
NS310, NL112, and other core academic courses. These 
courses also address Heinemann’s recommendation that all 
students in the major be required to take a core survey 
course that covers humanistic and critical approaches to 
the discipline.  Lastly, the leadership continuum addresses 
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the third suggestion that all students be required to 
participate in an internship.  If USNA is indeed a 
“leadership laboratory” then it may be argued that the 
Midshipmen experience is a prolonged internship designed to 
produce premier Navy and Marine Corps officers. Internships 
away from the Academy are conducted during the summers 
aboard ships, aircraft squadrons, submarines and with 
Marine Corps units.
b. Can Both be Accomplished in the Time 
Allotted?
The research concludes that both closure and 
further exploration can be accomplished in the time 
allotted, with the following constraints imposed:
1. NL401 cannot replace SWOS in the time allotted. 
Replacing SWOS should not be a goal.
2. Midshipmen should be expected to arrive in NL401 
with a thorough understanding of maritime skills, so 
that time spent on YPs or in simulators is the only 
time dedicated to training maritime skills.  The two-
hour laboratory period should be sufficient for 
meeting the training needs.
These constraints will be further addressed in the 
recommendations portion of this chapter.
c. Is One Cancelled Out by Including the Other?
There is no evidence to support that the 
inclusion of one philosophy cancels out the other.  Many of 
the training and educational needs in NL401 are 
complimentary, especially the areas of Division Officer 
training needs, affective needs, and cognitive needs.  
Evidence suggests that the most difficult needs to 
integrate are the watchstanding training needs.  Respondent 
data, especially from the NL401 instructor focus group, 
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suggest that during the time spent on watchstanding 
training needs very little learning and thinking is 
occurring outside of those areas. Furthermore, data 
collected from most senior respondents suggest that in 
their opinion these skills are more easily learned and 
taught aboard a ship.  Data from Department Heads also 
suggests that their superior performance in watchstanding 
skills is attributed to their maximizing the potential of 
summer cruise, and not their performance in the classroom. 
In summary, data suggest that, due to the nature of the 
training, if NL401 is structured to train Midshipmen 
exclusively in the areas of maritime skills, other learning 
opportunities will be cancelled out.
d. If We are Forced to Chose Between the Two, 
Which Should be Emphasized?
An answer to this question is difficult to 
determine.  Perhaps a more appropriate question would be: 
If we are forced to chose between several structures for 
the course, which content area should be de-emphasized?   
As previously stated, in the case of NL401, data from 
nearly every respondent group supports different 
philosophies regarding the structure of the course.  They 
are:
 NL401 Instructors – overwhelmingly support 
closure for the maritime continuum.
 DMP/PMP – This group appears to be split between 
supporting an experience that provides closure 
for the leadership continuum, and supporting a 
combination of dome and spire characteristics.
 The Fleet – overwhelmingly support further 
exploration into the duties and responsibilities 
of Division Officers.
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As previously mentioned, data suggest that focusing 
entirely on providing closure for the maritime continuum is 
the structure that will promote the least integration, 
synthesis, thinking, and learning.  Therefore, this is the 
structure that should be avoided.  The nature of 
watchstanding skills training is entirely practical, and as 
such doesn’t meet the criteria for being an effective 
capstone course. However, evidence does not suggest that 
these needs should be entirely ignored. 
e. An Ideal Structure?
A definitive conclusion regarding NL401 course 
structure is difficult to reach.  Each need identified in 
the research is important to the stakeholders, and if all 
are met in NL401, the course will undoubtedly improve the 
performance of USNA Ensigns in the Surface Navy.  It seems 
like the most appropriate structure, which strikes a 
balance between education and practical training and 
maximizes the potential of the course, would be a 
combination of all four structures identified during data 
analysis with only the two-hour laboratory period dedicated 
to providing closure to the maritime continuum.  It appears 
that the most important needs are affective and cognitive 
educational needs, followed closely by Division Officer 
training needs.  The course should be structured to 
integrate and synthesize training and education in these 
areas. More discussion will be provided in the 
recommendations section.   
4. Summary of Conclusions
In summary, data were used to draw conclusions 
regarding the needs of NL401, and gaps associated with 
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those needs.  Several affective and cognitive educational 
needs were identified as a top priority for the course.  
Division Officer training needs were the next most 
important, followed by watchstanding training needs.  
Regarding the effectiveness of the leadership continuum and 
its subordinate maritime continuum, data suggest that both 
are highly effective in ensuring watchstanding training 
needs are met; USNA is maximizing the potential of its 
unique resources.  Data suggest however that the continuum 
may not be as effective in ensuring the affective and 
cognitive, and Division Officer training needs are 
satisfied. Based on these data, it was determined that 
NL401 should be structured to focus on integrating and 
synthesizing the USNA experience with Division Officer 
training and education in order to be most effective as a 
capstone course.  Further, NL401 will not be improved by 
totally integrating the Division Officer at Sea modules 
into the course, but may be improved by introducing a few 
of them. The final research question regarding a Fleet 
feedback mechanism will be addressed next in the 
recommendations section of this chapter. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
This portion of Chapter VI is dedicated to exploring 
recommendations for improving NL401.  Based on the 
conclusions, several recommendations are made. First, 
Heinemann’s remaining suggestions for designing an 
effective dome and spire combination capstone course will 
be discussed.  Next, the impact of having a separate 
practicum focused on culminating the maritime and 
watchstanding continuum, and a capstone focused on the 
culminating the USNA leadership continuum, and promoting 
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further exploration will be presented.  Third, a 
recommendation regarding who is most qualified to teach the 
capstone course will be given, followed by recommendations 
pertaining to specific needs.  Then suggestions for three 
feedback mechanisms will be given.  Finally, 
recommendations for further research will be presented.
1. Heinemann’s Remaining Suggestions
Heinemann’s remaining two suggestions for making a 
capstone course work are very simple.  The first is that 
the curricula should require students to maintain all 
course material that was previously covered. This seems 
easy enough to implement, and could be strengthened by 
requiring a graded examination during the first few weeks 
of the capstone course.  This would force students to keep 
and review previously covered material and would allow the 
instructors to ascertain their level of preparedness and 
comprehension.
The second suggestion is to ensure all instructors 
have access to and review the syllabi of related courses. 
This also seems easy to implement, and seems like the only 
way to achieve synthesis.  This would help lessen the 
problem of NL401 instructors only covering personally 
relevant material.  A further suggestion is to have first-
year instructors teach the seminar courses, and only the 
most senior instructors who have been exposed to the other 
curricula teach NL401; this can be thought of as a 
leadership continuum for NL401 instructors.  
2. Separate Practicum and Capstone?
The next recommendation is to separate the NL401 
curriculum into a practicum, culminating the maritime 
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continuum and potentially the Division Officer training 
needs, and a true capstone that culminates the leadership 
continuum.  Data support the belief that First Class 
Midshipmen who service select Surface Warfare, have had the 
opportunity to acquire the basic maritime skills they are 
expected to possess when they arrive at their first 
command.  They should not need any more than a two- hour-
laboratory period per week to culminate the maritime 
continuum. Two hours of classroom instruction and hands- on 
experience on YPs and in simulators appears to be more than 
enough to ensure the performance of USNA graduates is 
superior to their peers from other commissioning sources.  
Furthermore, this will allow the instructors and 
administrators to focus their efforts on ensuring the 
educational needs are met during the course.  As previously 
stated it is difficult to integrate and synthesize the 
maritime training aspect of the course into any other areas 
of instruction.  Attempting to do both seems to be 
counterproductive at the worst, and inefficient at the 
least.  
3. Who is Most Qualified to Teach NL401?
This begs the following questions: If the course is 
divided into a practicum and true capstone, who is most 
qualified to teach the capstone portion?  Surface Warfare 
Officers are undoubtedly the most qualified to train 
Midshipmen in the areas of maritime skills and practical 
shipboard knowledge.  They have all been Division Officers 
fairly recently in their careers, and as such should be 
able to effectively and efficiently culminate the maritime 
continuum and train and educate Midshipmen on the duties 
and responsibilities of Division Officers in the Fleet.  
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However, those who are stationed in the Seamanship and 
Navigation Department, approximately seventy-five percent 
of NL401 instructors, have had no formal training or 
education in the leadership education aspects of NL401; 
they do not appear to be qualified to synthesize and 
integrate all the material covered during the Midshipman 
experience.  Furthermore, their close proximity to the 
Fleet and the implementation of DOSP, may be a hindrance to 
satisfying these important needs.  Data suggest that they 
are too focused on ensuring students are proficient in 
bridge watchstanding skills.
Therefore, it is my recommendation that Seamanship and 
Navigation Department be responsible for teaching the 
practicum, while LEL be responsible for identifying those 
who are qualified to teach the capstone. LEL DMPs and PMPs
have the backgrounds most suited for meeting the affective 
and cognitive needs of the course.  Potential candidates 
who should be considered are senior Surface Warfare 
Officers with academic backgrounds, and SWO LEAD program 
graduates who have a master’s degree in leadership and 
human resource development.  It is important to note that 
this change does not constitute a departure from SWOs 
teaching future SWOs.  The research indicates that 
substantial cultural and other educational elements would 
not be met if instructors were pulled from other warfare 
communities.  For example, the affective and cognitive 
needs of a future Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps and 
those of a future Surface Warfare Officer vary 
significantly.      
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4. Individual Needs
Recommendations on closing the gaps pertaining to 
individual training and educational needs of NL401 are 
fairly simple and all but one rely on a close integration 
of YP personnel and material, and the NL401 curriculum.  
The practical portion of NL401, or the separate practicum, 
should be aligned as closely to a shipboard Division as 
possible. The recent disestablishment of Naval Station 
Annapolis may aid this endeavor.  The Chairman of 
Seamanship and Navigation Department is now responsible for 
all aspects of YP Operations, which should eliminate 
communication and scheduling difficulties, and aid in the 
implementation of this program.  In this scenario, the 
instructor will fill the roles of the CO, XO, and 
Department Head.  The students will fill various Division 
Officer, enlisted, and collateral duty roles, and the 
enlisted personnel assigned to YP duty will fill the roles 
of actual enlisted members; the actual Senior Enlisted 
member will act as the CMC.  With this recommendation, it 
is important that the class sizes be as small as is 
feasible and practical.  Each member of the “command” will 
be responsible for the traditional duties of the roles they 
are filling; and most importantly, they are held 
accountable in the same way as they will be on their ship.  
To add to the utility of this recommendation, students will 
change Division Officer roles periodically.  This 
researcher believes the three most important needs this 
will address are 3M training, fitness report and personnel 
evaluation writing, and the affective needs of a SWO 
Division Officer. 
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a. 3M Training on YPs
Each NL401 section taking ownership of a YP or 
several YPs, presents an opportunity to learn 3M in the 
most hands-on means available to USNA.  Students, under the 
supervision of the instructor and senior enlisted, should 
maintain the 3M material for each YP as they would their 
Division’s.  They should sign weekly and quarterly boards, 
conduct PMS spot-checks, and perform all other related 
duties.  Having an actual 3M program to manage prior to 
arriving in the Fleet, is an opportunity available only to 
USNA graduates.
b. Fitness Reports and Performance Evaluations
As Division Officers in the “command,” students 
should also be responsible for personnel evaluations 
(evals) and fitness reports (fitreps) during the reporting 
periods that are congruent with their course schedules.  
Under the supervision and leadership of their Department 
Head and Senior Enlisted they should practice writing 
either real or mock evaluations.  Additionally, part of the 
course material should be a compilation of actual fitreps 
and evals from the Fleet, which cover a variety of 
performance levels.  Finally, at the end of the semester, 
they should be required to write their own fitness report.  
This will provide them an opportunity to reflect on what 
they have learned over the semester and give them the 
practical experience necessary to succeed in this area in 
the Fleet.    
c. Affective Needs
The extensive integration of YPs and the NL401 
practicum will also address some of the affective needs 
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identified in the research. Holding the Midshipmen 
responsible and accountable for the safe operation of the 
ship, the ship’s mission, and sailors, will instill a sense 
of responsibility.  I also believe that interactions with 
enlisted personnel, when students are acting in the 
capacity of Division Officers (i.e., held accountable for 
tangible outcomes), will encourage assertiveness and will 
bolster communication skills.  Furthermore, this scenario 
will provide the opportunity to synthesize and integrate 
the material from the capstone portion of the course.
d. Character Development Seminars
The final recommendation for ensuring individual 
needs are met is to increase Midshipman participation in 
Character Development Seminars. These seminars provide a 
venue for integrating and synthesizing material, an 
opportunity for Midshipmen to discuss character related 
issues in a relaxed environment, and also provide a means 
for ODEV faculty and staff to gauge the “moral compass” of 
the Brigade of Midshipmen.  It is my recommendation that 
all Midshipmen be required to attend at least one seminar 
per semester.  Furthermore, seminar leaders should be 
required to submit written reports from each session to the 
Chairman of Officer Development Division, via the Deputy 
for Character Programs.  
5. Feedback Mechanisms
The final recommendations for improving NL401 involve 
gaining feedback from various entities at various times.  
As stated in Chapter one, NL401 is the most dynamic course 
at USNA.  Feedback on how the course is doing at preparing 
Midshipmen to be SWOs is critical to ensuring its future 
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success.  Also, feedback can and should be used to gauge 
how well Midshipmen are preparing themselves.  The 
following paragraphs elaborate.
a. Summer Cruise
Data suggest that there is a direct correlation 
between performance and effort put forth during Midshipman 
summer cruise, and performance as Division Officers in the 
Fleet.  As such, it is my recommendation that Midshipmen be 
evaluated on their summer cruise performance. This will do 
two things:  
1. It will allow USNA to evaluate the performance of 
its Midshipmen relative to other commissioning 
sources.
2. It will require Midshipmen to perform.  
In order for this to be effective, faculty and staff need 
to hold Midshipmen accountable for their performance; there 
should be consequences for poor performance on summer 
cruise.  The “Three M’s,” meals, movies, and mattress, will 
no longer be acceptable summer cruise behavior for USNA 
Midshipmen. 
b. Fleet Perceptions 
Secondly, this researcher recommends soliciting 
the Fleet for feedback.  NL401 must adapt to the needs of 
the Fleet.  A simple survey given to all USNA SWO Ensigns a 
year after commissioning in my opinion is the most feasible 
feedback mechanism. If NL401 administrators know what 
Ensigns wished they were taught, the effectiveness of the 
course could be increased dramatically. 
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c. Comprehensive, End of Semester Test or 
Project
Finally, feedback should be taken in the form of 
an end- of- semester test or project for the Midshipmen. 
NL401 is an academic course, and as such, students receive 
a grade.  The potential to fail the course must be real.  
It should be taken seriously and a comprehensive test will 
force the students to demonstrate their ability to 
integrate and synthesize the material they have learned 
during their four years at the Naval Academy.
6. Recommendations for Further Research
This research appears to only scratch the surface of 
identifying and meeting the educational and training needs 
of NL401.  Much potential for further research exists.  
Each need area, Division Officer, watchstanding, affective 
and cognitive, could be separate theses in themselves.  
Furthermore, the qualitative nature of this research does 
not lend itself well to hard numbers.  Due to the time 
constraints presented by interviews and focus groups, only 
small samples of stakeholders were reached.  A quantitative 
survey regarding the needs of the course could be 
administered to a larger population of respondents, and 
would provide a more clear understanding of the needs of 
the course.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to summarize the 
results of the data analysis, and discuss the relationships 
between the results and current USNA academic policy, 
leadership and professional education curricula, USNA 
education and training programs, and current Fleet 
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policies, namely DOSP.  First, a summary of findings was 
presented. Next conclusions drawn from the data were 
discussed, followed by the presentation and discussion of 
several recommendations that were based on the data, 
literature, and background. 
The training and educational goals identified as the 
top priority were affective needs, followed by cognitive 
educational needs, Division Officer training needs, and 
lastly, watchstanding training needs.  Based on the needs 
identified, the research concludes that NL401 should be 
structured to focus on integrating and synthesizing the 
USNA experience with Division Officer training and 
education in order to be most effective as a capstone 
course; it should be a combination of dome and spire.  The 
research also determined that the leadership continuum and 
its subordinate maritime continuum are highly effective at 
training Midshipmen in watchstanding skills.  
The primary recommendations made were to divide the 
course into a practicum, focused on maritime and Division 
Officer skills, and a true capstone focused on culminating 
the Midshipmen leadership, ethical and character 
development experience.  Instructors for each portion 
should continue to be SWOs, but the capstone instructors 
should have academic credentials in the areas of leadership
education or human resources; or at least ample leadership 
experience required to teach high-level material. Other 
recommendations included total integration of YP operations 
into the curriculum, feedback from the Fleet and from the 
students, and making participation in Character Development 
Seminars mandatory. 
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